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1654 
Article 
Campaign Finance in the Hybrid Realm of 
Recall Elections 
Elizabeth Garrett†
In the ever-evolving jurisprudence of campaign finance, 
one principle has endured: the rules governing candidate elec-
tions are analyzed differently from the rules governing ballot 
measures because the latter elections have been found not to 
implicate the state’s legitimate interest in combatting quid pro 
quo corruption.
 
1
 
†  John J. and Frances R. Duggan Professor of Law, Political Science and 
Public Policy, University of Southern California. I appreciate the assistance of 
Rosanne Kirkorian of the U.S.C. Gould School of Law Library and the excep-
tional research assistance of Alexander Fullman (B.A. 2013, USC); I am grate-
ful to Richard Briffault, Elisabeth Gerber, Rick Hasen and Andrei Marmor for 
comments on earlier drafts. I also appreciate the guidance provided by Jona-
than Becker, Administrator of the Division of Ethics and Accountability of the 
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board, and Nathan Judnic, Campaign 
Finance Auditor—Ethics Specialist, Wisconsin Government Accountability 
Board. I served as an expert for the city of San Diego during consideration of 
amendments to ordinances governing recall elections adopted in the wake of 
litigation, see Citizens for Clean Government v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 
647 (9th Cir. 2007); and I was a commissioner on the California Fair Political 
Practice Commission (FPPC) until March 2013. The opinions expressed in this 
Article are solely mine, do not constitute an official position of the FPPC, and 
reflect changes in the case law since my testimony before the City Council and 
in the litigation. Copyright © 2013 by Elizabeth Garrett. 
 In the absence of candidates in initiative elec-
tions (so the courts naïvely believe), there is no one for monied 
interests to influence unduly in order to gain favorable votes, 
access, or other targeted benefits. Therefore, there is no specter 
of quid pro quo corruption that might lead voters to lose faith in 
democratic institutions. It should now be apparent to even a 
casual observer of the initiative process that candidates are 
very involved in ballot measures; they use initiatives to influ-
ence turnout in elections in which they are also running, and 
 1. See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 
204–05 (1999); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 
(1978). 
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they resort to initiatives to adopt policy change they cannot en-
act through the traditional legislative system. 
The close relationship between candidates and direct de-
mocracy is formally present in a context of growing salience: re-
call elections. In the nineteen states that allow recalls on the 
state level and the twenty-nine or more that provide for recalls 
of local officials,2 the hybrid nature of our democratic institu-
tions is clear and draws into question any easy bifurcation of 
campaign finance rules that turns on the formal presence of a 
candidate. Recall elections have garnered more attention as 
governors and state legislators face the possibility of being re-
moved from office in the midst of their terms.3 The successful 
recall of Gray Davis in California was unusual enough to have 
made national news; the fact that he was succeeded by movie 
star and politician Arnold Schwarzenegger ensured that the 
world focused on the 2003 election.4 More recently, in 2012, 
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker successfully fought to com-
plete his term in the face of a recall sparked by reaction to his 
championing state legislation that weakened collective bargain-
ing rights for government workers.5 Local officials in more than 
half the nation’s municipalities have long dealt with the pro-
spect of recalls;6 use of this tool of direct democracy is more fre-
quent at the local level and more often successful.7
 
 2. Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/recall-of-state-officials.aspx (last up-
dated June 6, 2012) [hereinafter NCSL, Recall of State Officials]. 
 
 3. See Joshua Spivak, 2011, The Year of the Recall, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 27, 
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/dec/27/opinion/la-oe-spivak-recall 
-20111227 (noting the accelerating trend of recalls at the state level over the 
past thirty years). Only one governor other than the two discussed in this Ar-
ticle has faced a recall: Lynn Frazier of North Dakota was successfully re-
called in 1921. MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DI-
RECT DEMOCRACY: CALIFORNIA’S RECALL AND BEYOND 11 (2008). 
 4. See Michael Finnegan, Gov. Davis is Recalled, Schwarzenegger Wins, 
L.A. TIMES, (Oct. 8, 2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/08/local/me 
-recall8 (noting “flood of international media coverage” for the recall election). 
 5. Had Wisconsin voters had access to the tool of popular referendum, 
they might have used it to repeal the law restricting collective bargaining, ra-
ther than resorting to the blunter tool of recall. In November 2011, Ohio held a 
popular referendum election regarding a similar law, which was overturned 
with 62% voting for repeal. David Ariosto, Ohio Voters Repeal Law Limiting 
Union Rights, CNN Projects, CNN (Nov. 8, 2011, 11:12 PM), http:// 
www.cnn.com/2011/11/08/us/ohio-collective-bargaining-vote. Although Wiscon-
sin has no popular referendum mechanism, California does but opponents of 
Davis still used the recall, perhaps because discontent was driven by a series 
of decisions and not just one piece of legislation. 
 6. By 2001, more than 60% of cities allowed for a recall. Richard C. 
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Scholarly and judicial attention to the rules governing re-
call elections—particularly campaign finance regulations—has 
been minimal, with only a few challenges to contribution limi-
tations reaching the appellate courts in the last few years.8 In 
this Article, I will use recall elections as a way to consider the 
current state of campaign finance jurisprudence as it relates to 
all the mechanisms of direct democracy. Recalls provide a dif-
ferent framework to assess campaign finance rules because 
they are explicitly hybrid elections, combining a ballot question 
about the recall of an official with, sometimes simultaneously, 
the election of a successor. The Court’s recent articulation of 
constitutional principles that apply to campaign finance laws in 
candidate elections, Citizens United v. FEC,9
Part I will lay out the structure of the recall process, par-
ticularly in California and Wisconsin, the two states in which 
statewide recalls of governors have shaken the political estab-
lishment and caught the attention of the nation. Part II will 
analyze the constitutional issues raised by campaign finance 
regimes that often include contribution limitations affecting re-
call elections; this discussion is shaped now by Citizens United 
and other relevant decisions of the Roberts Court.
 affects the analy-
sis of the laws that can regulate the various players in a recall 
election. The analysis of recalls and campaign finance will be 
relevant not only to future consideration of laws applying to 
such elections, but it also offers a lens through which to assess 
campaign finance rules applying to ballot measures generally 
and to evaluate the Court’s narrow view of the kind of state in-
terest that can justify regulation in candidate elections. 
10
 
Feiock & Seung-Bum Yang, Factors Affecting Constitutional Choice: The Case 
of the Recall in Municipal Charters, 37 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 40, 41 (2005). 
 I will argue 
 7. See Rachel Weinstein, Note, You’re Fired!, The Voters’ Version of “The 
Apprentice”: An Analysis of Local Recall Elections in California, 15 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 131, 131, 142 (2005); see also Bruce E. Cain et al., Barriers to 
Recalling Elected Officials: A Cross-State Analysis of the Incidence and Success 
of Recall Petitions, in CLICKER POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE CALIFORNIA RECALL 
17, 21 tbl.2.1 (Shaun Bowler & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2006). 
 8. See, e.g., Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 2012); Citi-
zens for Clean Gov’t v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 649 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 10. I will focus here on limitations on contributions. It is clear since Buck-
ley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), that campaign expenditures can-
not be capped or limited, other than in the context of some voluntary public 
financing programs. Disclosure with respect to contributions and expenditures 
seems unproblematic under current jurisprudence, although challenges to dis-
closure are increasing and issues of the appropriate design of disclosure laws 
raise policy issues. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 
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that the Court’s insistence that the only important state inter-
est in the realm of campaign finance is a narrow understanding 
of quid pro quo corruption means that any framework to regu-
late recall spending will be partial. Part III will extend this 
analysis and argue that the conclusions reached about permis-
sible regulatory structures in the context of recalls implicate 
the way states and municipalities regulate money in ballot 
measure campaigns generally. Moreover, the conclusions that 
emerge from the analysis powerfully suggest that the Court’s 
current jurisprudential framework for campaign finance rules 
in all elections is insufficient, ignoring a more compelling justi-
fication for regulating money in direct democracy: working to 
ensure equality of the opportunity to participate in the political 
realm. 
I.  MODERN GUBERNATORIAL RECALLS: CALIFORNIA 
AND WISCONSIN   
I have argued that the importance of direct democracy as 
part of the comprehensive design of democratic institutions 
means that the best way to understand these institutions, and 
to devise meaningful reforms at the state and local levels, is 
through the lens of hybrid democracy. Taken as a whole, de-
mocracy in the United States is hybrid because it is neither 
wholly representative nor wholly direct; instead it is a complex 
combination of both at the local and state levels, which in turn 
influences national politics.11 Nowhere is hybrid democracy 
more evident than in the context of recalls, particularly those 
in the six states, including California and Wisconsin, in which 
the election is called after a successful petition drive and the 
recall and the vote on the successor for the office occur simul-
taneously.12
 
2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 273–76 (2010) [hereinafter Briffault, Disclosure 2.0]; 
Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295–96 (2005); 
Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclo-
sure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 557–60 (2012) [hereinafter 
Hasen, Chill Out]; see also infra text accompanying notes 
 In both cases, campaign contributions to commit-
147–67 (discussing 
proposed changes in disclosure laws prompted by this analysis). 
 11. See Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1096, 1097 (2005). 
 12. Even in states that do not have simultaneous successor elections, the 
hybrid nature of a recall has been identified as relevant to the assessment of 
campaign finance laws. See, e.g., Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 11, Farris v. Seabrook, No. 11-5431-RJB (W.D. Wash. July 15, 
2011) (noting recalls are a “hybrid of the two” kinds of elections in a process 
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tees or for expenses related to the recall, even those controlled 
by the officeholder or potential candidates, are unlimited, while 
contributions made directly to candidates’ campaigns are gov-
erned by the contribution limits that apply in regular elections 
for the office at issue. 
The bifurcated campaign rules affect the dynamics of fund-
raising in California and Wisconsin differently, however, be-
cause they have adopted somewhat different recall processes. 
In both states a petition drive begins the recall process, and 
money raised during the petition circulation period is not re-
stricted by contribution limits, although disclosure laws apply. 
Neither state limits the availability of the recall to particular 
grounds, such as misconduct, but relies entirely on the petition 
process to trigger the election, just as in any initiative process.13 
In California, those seeking to recall a governor must obtain 
signatures equal to 12% of those who voted in the last guberna-
torial election;14 in Wisconsin, the threshold is higher so that 
recall proponents must obtain signatures equal to 25% of such 
voters.15 California is also an easier place to qualify a recall 
than Wisconsin because recall advocates have longer to get the 
signatures; they have 150 days for circulation, compared to on-
ly 60 days in Wisconsin.16 In both the recall efforts against Da-
vis and Walker, recall proponents made sure to find many more 
petition signers than necessary to ensure qualification. Pro-
recall forces in California turned in around 1.6 million signa-
tures when they needed only around 900,000.17 Anti-Walker 
forces gathered nearly double the required 540,208 signatures, 
turning in petitions with more than 900,000 valid signatures.18
Usually success in gathering signatures turns on the abil-
ity to raise significant amounts of money for the petition drives, 
an effort unrestrained by contribution limitations. As petition 
drives increasingly rely on paid circulators—now the norm in 
 
 
where the recall vote is held separately and a successor is appointed from a 
list provided by the political party of the recalled official). 
 13. NCSL, Recall of State Officials, supra note 2. 
 14. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(b). 
 15. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9.10(1)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 16. Compare CAL. CONST. art. II, § 14(a), with WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9.10(1)(b). 
 17. See DEREK CRESSMAN, THE RECALL’S BROKEN PROMISE: HOW BIG 
MONEY STILL RUNS CALIFORNIA POLITICS 45 (2007). Almost 1.36 million were 
certified by the Secretary of State. Id. 
 18. See Recall Election Information: 2012 Recall Petitions and Challenges, 
WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, http://gab.wi.gov/elections-voting/recall 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
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successful efforts in California and other states with active ini-
tiative processes—money is a sufficient condition for ballot ac-
cess and therefore often viewed as necessary.19 The forces seek-
ing to unseat Gray Davis in California faced an uncertain fate 
until Representative Darrell Issa, who aspired to the position, 
injected $1.7 million of his own money into the campaign.20 The 
Wisconsin recall is atypical because supporters used an army of 
volunteer signature gatherers working feverishly in the rela-
tively brief time allowed for circulation and in the midst of the 
harshest winter months.21 Nevertheless, some financial re-
sources were required to provide organizational leadership for 
such a large volunteer effort and to provide resources for the 
certification process and ensuing challenges, and the leading 
pro-recall group raised at least half a million dollars during the 
60 days the petitions were circulated.22
The key differences in the two states’ recall process result 
from the structure of the election and the ballot. In California, 
once the recall is certified, the election it triggers has two parts 
on the same ballot—a structure that underscores the hybrid 
nature of the process.
 
23 First, voters are asked to vote on 
whether or not to recall the official; a majority of voters will de-
cide that question. Next, voters are asked to pick a replacement 
from among a list of successors—a group that does not include 
the incumbent. The plurality winner takes office only if the re-
call succeeds. Thus, voters choose a successor without knowing 
whether the current incumbent will be recalled, and even vot-
ers who vote against the recall, or do not vote at all on the re-
call, can vote in the replacement election.24
 
 19. See Shaun Bowler & Bruce Cain, Introduction—Recalling the Recall: 
Reflections on California’s Recent Political Adventure, 37 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
7, 8 (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 
77 TEX. L. REV. 1845, 1851–52 (1999) [hereinafter Garrett, Agenda Setting].  
 This structure can 
 20. Shaun Bowler & Bruce E. Cain, Introduction, in CLICKER POLITICS, 
supra note 7, at 1, 5. 
 21. Sasha Issenberg, The Power of the Petition: How the Effort to Recall 
Scott Walker Could Swing the 2012 Presidential Election, SLATE (May 8, 2012, 
11:39 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/ 
05/scott_walker_recalling_the_wisconsin_governor_could_swing_the_2012_ 
presidential_election_.html. 
 22. Campaign Finance Report GAB-2: Recall 60 Day Report for Committee 
to Recall Walker, WIS. CAMPAIGN FIN. INFO. SYS., http://cfis.wi.gov/ 
ReportsOutputFiles/0600022Recall60dayreport2012bac 
021272012120044PMGAB2Report.pdf (last amended Mar. 13, 2012). 
 23. For a description of the voting process in California, see Partnoy v. 
Shelley, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1070–71 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 
 24. Id. at 1079 (striking down a California law that had required voter to 
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lead to a situation in which the incumbent is recalled by only a 
slim majority, and his successor enters office with fewer votes 
than those cast opposing the recall (and presumably supporting 
the incumbent). That specter of a successor with less popular 
support than the incumbent was a real possibility in 2003 be-
cause 135 candidates were listed in the second half of the bal-
lot.25 Arnold Schwarzenegger’s substantial popularity, com-
bined with the lack of strong support for the lackluster 
Governor Davis, prevented that unfortunate outcome from oc-
curring, as Schwarzenegger captured 48% of the vote, and only 
45% of the voters opposed the recall (and thus supported Da-
vis’s retention in his office).26
The process in Wisconsin is crucially different.
 
27 A suffi-
cient number of valid signatures on a recall petition triggers a 
new election for the office. There is no separate vote on the re-
call itself, as in California; instead, there is a recall election for 
the office six weeks after the certification of the petitions, and 
the incumbent automatically appears as a candidate in that 
election unless he has resigned. If there are more than two 
candidates for the position, then a partisan recall primary is 
held six weeks after the certification and the recall election oc-
curs four weeks after that primary. Access to the ballot is gov-
erned by the rules that apply in regular elections for that posi-
tion. Independent candidates, subject to ordinary ballot access 
rules, appear only on the final recall election. Of the six states 
that allow simultaneous recall and successor elections, Wiscon-
sin’s process is the more typical.28
 
vote in the recall part of the ballot in order to be eligible to vote for successor). 
 This method of recall is hy-
brid in nature because the candidate elections are triggered by 
a petition on an issue—the recall—and thus include a period of 
time governed by the rules that apply in initiative campaigns. 
 25. PETER SCHRAG, CALIFORNIA: AMERICA’S HIGH-STAKES EXPERIMENT 
167 (2006). Confusing ballot access laws led the Secretary of State to rule that 
candidates seeking to run in a gubernatorial recall election needed only to ob-
tain 65 signatures and pay $3500 or obtain 10,000 signatures. Elizabeth Gar-
rett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 
254 (2004) [hereinafter Garrett, California Recall]. 
 26. See Bowler & Cain, supra note 20, at 1. 
 27. For a description of the Wisconsin process, see WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY BD., RECALL OF CONGRESSIONAL, COUNTY AND STATE OFFICIALS 8–9 
(2009), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/65/recall_ 
manual_for_congressiona_county_and_state__82919.pdf. 
 28. See NCSL, Recall of State Officials, supra note 2 (noting that Colorado 
and California use a two-part ballot and that Wisconsin’s approach is shared 
by Arizona, Nevada, and North Dakota). 
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This structural difference leads to variations in the appli-
cation of campaign finance restrictions, other than disclosure 
laws, which apply throughout both states’ processes. Both 
states allow unlimited contributions during the recall portion of 
the election, while applying the usual contribution limitations 
for candidates during the part of the election focused on who 
will serve the remainder of the term. However, the different 
structures for recall elections mean that this shared general 
rule plays out differently in the two states. In California, the 
recall portion of the election begins from the time the petitions 
are circulated and ends only on Election Day, when both the 
fate of the recall and the replacement, if necessary, are deter-
mined by the people. Thus, not only can committees unrelated 
to the officeholder or replacement candidates raise unlimited 
money throughout the entirety of the election period, but so can 
the officeholder himself, who is not a candidate in the second 
half of the election. Gray Davis was involved in the 2003 recall 
election only to the extent he opposed the recall, the sole meth-
od through which he could remain in office. The anti-recall 
committee he controlled, “Californians Against the Costly Re-
call of the Governor,” raised nearly $18.3 million in part be-
cause he was not limited at any point by the then-effective 
$21,200 cap on contributions by individuals to gubernatorial 
candidates.29
This structure in California also allows replacement candi-
dates a mechanism through which to raise money from unlim-
ited contributions throughout the campaign period, even 
though donations to campaign committees are restricted. A 
candidate can form a separate committee with the purpose of 
supporting the recall; that committee is governed by the cam-
paign rules that apply to recalls, not to candidate elections. 
Thus, Arnold Schwarzenegger had both a campaign committee 
and a pro-recall committee, called the “Total Recall” committee, 
with the latter raising $4.5 million in unrestricted contribu-
tions that were deployed in part to fund advertisements featur-
ing Schwarzenegger supporting the recall.
 
30
 
 29. The campaign records for this committee show several six-figure gifts 
from individuals, unions, and political organizations. See Campaign Finance: 
Californians Against the Costly Recall of the Governor, CAL. SECRETARY ST., 
http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Committees/Detail.aspx?id=1256416& 
session=2003&view=received (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 Other than minor 
differences in the words the candidates said, the ads funded by 
 30. Garrett, California Recall, supra note 25, at 251. 
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the Total Recall committee and by the campaign committee 
communicated the same message: Arnold should be the next 
governor of California. Other major candidates like Lieutenant 
Governor Cruz Bustamante used the same two-committee 
strategy for maximum flexibility with regard to fundraising,31
In contrast, in Wisconsin an incumbent governor can raise 
money from unlimited contributions only with respect to ex-
penses related to the recall and incurred before the recall elec-
tion is certified.
 
although Democrat Bustamante’s recall-oriented committee 
opposed the recall, arguably sending a confused and confusing 
message to voters. 
32 Once the election is scheduled, the regular 
limitations on contributions regulate all the candidates’ cam-
paigns, including that of the incumbent. Currently the limit on 
individual contributions in a gubernatorial election is $10,000.33 
However, the incumbent can continue to raise unlimited 
amounts throughout the election period to use to defray pre-
certification recall expenses, including any contests of the order 
to hold a recall election, and to pay debts incurred during the 
petition circulation period. Walker continued to raise money 
through unlimited contributions after the election was ordered 
because he had $2.5 million of debts related to recall expense;34 
these contributions included a $100,000 donation from the 
chairman of a Wisconsin construction company accepted just 
days before the election.35 In addition, there is no requirement 
that the incumbent form separate committees for recall fund-
raising and re-election campaign fundraising so regulated and 
unregulated money is comingled, with accounting done through 
annotated expense reports.36
 
 31. Floyd Feeney, The 2003 California Gubernatorial Recall, 41 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 37, 60 (2007). 
 
 32. WIS. STAT. ANN § 11.26(13m)(b) (West 2004); see also WIS. GOV’T AC-
COUNTABILITY BD., CAMPAIGN FINANCE OVERVIEW: STATE CANDIDATES 6 
(2010), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/publication/63/ 
campaign_finance_overview_statecandidates_pdf_86800.pdf. 
 33. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.26(1)(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 34. Telephone Interview with Jonathan Becker, Div. Adm’r, Ethics Div., 
Wis. Gov’t Accountability Bd. (June 1, 2012) (notes on file with author). 
 35. See Ryan Ekvall, Murky Campaign-Finance Laws Depend on “Honor 
System,” Expert Says, WIS. REP. (July 9, 2012), http://watchdog.org/26589/wi 
-murky-recall-finance-laws-depend-on-honor-system-expert-says/. 
 36. Wisconsin rules applying to gubernatorial recalls makes separating 
recall fundraising from election fundraising tricky because “all campaign do-
nations go into one pot.” Judith Davidoff, Walker’s Unlimited Recall Fundrais-
ing Set to End, DAILY PAGE (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.thedailypage.com/ 
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Scott Walker clearly understood how important this period 
of fundraising—and political spending—was for his future. He 
and his supporters worked to extend the period on both ends.37 
When it appeared inevitable that Democrats and union sup-
porters would mount a recall effort, a Republican activist filed 
paperwork to circulate a recall petition a week or so before the 
Democrats were ready to file theirs.38 That preemptive action 
allowed Walker to begin collecting unlimited donations earlier 
than waiting for the other side to trigger the process. Similarly, 
Walker’s decision to contest the petitions was likely motivated 
at least in part to postpone the start of ordinary contribution 
restrictions.39 During this recall petition period, he was able to 
raise about half of the $30 million he ultimately accumulated in 
his war chest,40 which included several large donations from 
individuals, such as $500,000 from a Houston-based home de-
veloper and $510,000 from a Wisconsin billionaire.41
The vast majority of Walker’s recall-focused campaign war 
chest was spent on communications to voters opposing the re-
call,
 
42
 
isthmus/article.php?article=36328; see also Ekvall, supra note 
 which also allowed him to begin his campaign earlier 
35 (noting diffi-
culty of tracking expenses that can be paid for by unlimited contributions and 
those that are campaign related). 
 37. Wisconsin law allows candidates to raise unlimited contributions 
starting at the filing of a recall petition, and ending when all challenges to an 
election order are concluded. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.26(13m)(b). 
 38. See Meghan Chua, Scott Walker Recall Underway: Democrats Critical 
of Petition Filed by Republican Donor, DAILY CARDINAL, Nov. 7, 2011, at 1 (re-
porting that a Republican donor filed recall paperwork on November 4, prior to 
Democrats’ planned filing date of November 15). 
 39. See, e.g., Scott Bauer, Walker Seeks More Time for Review, GREEN BAY 
PRESS GAZETTE, Feb. 16, 2012, at A-3, available at http://www 
.greenbaypressgazette.com/viewart/20120216/GPG0101/202160588/Governor 
-Scott-Walker-seeks-more-time-review-recall-signatures. 
 40. See Paul Blumenthal, Scott Walker’s Unbelievable Fundraising Haul, 
HUFFPOST FUNDRACE (Apr. 30, 2012, 5:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost 
.com/2012/04/30/huffpost-fundrace----scot_n_1465858.html (reporting that 
Walker raised more than $13 million in the first three months of 2012, before 
the election was certified); Jason Stein et al., Walker Raises over $5 Million in 
a Month, Bringing Total to $30 Million, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 30, 
2012), http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/walker-barrett-to-release 
-fundraising-totals-later-tuesday-gu5jgr9-155466225.html. 
 41. See Tom Kertscher, Behind the Rhetoric: The In-State, Out-of-State 
Campaign Money Debate, POLITIFACT.COM (May 22, 2012, 6:00 PM), http:// 
www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2012/may/22/behind-the-rhetoric-state 
-out-state-money-debate/ (identifying Bob Perry of Houston and Diane Hen-
dricks of Wisconsin as donors to the Walker campaign).  
 42. The bulk of Walker’s expenditures during the petition circulation pe-
riod, around $7.7 million of $11.5 million total, were for broadcast ads and 
  
1664 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1654 
 
than any other contenders and make his case for retention un-
der much more lenient campaign finance rules. In addition, us-
ing unlimited contributions, he set up a website and other in-
frastructure during the circulation period,43 that he continued 
to use when the election campaign commenced. Although he 
could not spend this money for any expenses incurred after the 
election was ordered (other than to contest that order), he could 
use money from unlimited contributions up to the ordinary con-
tribution limitation per contributor for his campaign.44
The other difference between campaign finance rules as a 
result of the difference in the structure of the recalls in Califor-
nia and Wisconsin affects replacement candidates. In Wiscon-
sin, replacement candidates cannot simultaneously control 
campaign committees, subject to contribution limits, and recall-
focused committees, free of contribution limits, during the pri-
mary or general election campaign following a successful recall 
petition. Thus, no Democrat running in the Wisconsin recall 
primary could adopt the strategy of Schwarzenegger or Busta-
mante; instead, Wisconsin challengers faced significant limits 
on their ability to answer the publicity that Walker generated 
in the 60-plus days of the petition circulation. The language of 
the Wisconsin statute appears to allow potential candidates the 
opportunity to raise unlimited contributions for expenses relat-
ed to the recall petition process.
  
45
 
mailing. See Ben Jones, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Never Stopped Running, 
USA TODAY (May 27, 2012, 1:05 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
politics/story/2012-05-27/wisconsin-governor-scott-walker-recall/55226482/1; 
see also Davidoff, supra note 
 However, no potential oppo-
nent of Governor Walker used this capability in 2012, even 
36 (noting that the Government Accountability 
Board allowed recall funds to be used for advertisements). 
 43. For example, Walker spent over $100,000 during this period on web-
site development and information technology equipment and services. See 
View Expenses, WIS. CAMPAIGN FIN. INFO. SYS., http://cfis.wi.gov/Public/ 
Registration.aspx?page=ExpenseList (select “Friends of Scott Walker” under 
“Registrant Name” and “2012” under “Filing Year”; click “Search”; sort by 
“Expense Purpose”) (last visited Mar. 30, 2013). 
 44. Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, Dir. & Gen. Counsel, Wis. Gov. 
Accountability Bd., Recall Expense Funds: Contribution Limits and Residual 
Funds (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://gab.wi.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publication/63/memo_re_recall_expense_funds_contrib_limit_and_r_11875.pdf 
(“Upon reaching the conversion date and assuming all incurred recall expens-
es are satisfied, the limitations on contributions . . . apply to the residual re-
call funds.”). 
 45. The statute is phrased generally and would apply to anyone’s expens-
es falling into the category, not just the incumbent’s. WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 11.26(13m)(b) (West 2004) (suspending contribution limits for activities 
“connected with” a recall effort). 
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though one of the leading Democratic candidates, Kathleen 
Falk, signaled her intention to run in January by creating a 
gubernatorial campaign committee ostensibly focused on the 
2014 election.46 The failure of potential candidates to take ad-
vantage of this gap in regulation might have been due to the 
uncertainty of whether they would actually be on the general 
recall election ballot in the event the petition succeeded.47 In 
Wisconsin, aspiring gubernatorial candidates also have to win a 
primary; indeed, Falk lost in the primary to Tom Barrett, the 
mayor of Milwaukee.48 In addition, potential candidates would 
presumably be limited to communications in favor of a recall, 
perhaps with themselves as spokespeople, whereas the incum-
bent governor can produce a message opposing the recall that 
also emphasizes why he should stay in office—a message much 
more helpful in both stages of the recall process.49
This structure provides a significant advantage to the in-
cumbent, and the Wisconsin system generally is more favorable 
to incumbents than is the California one.
 
50
 
 46. See Campaign Registration Statement, State of Wisconsin GAB-1, 
Kathleen Falk, Democrat (Jan. 18, 2012) (on file with author). The staff of the 
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board indicated that while the statute 
seems to allow anyone to take advantage of the petition period to raise money 
from unlimited contributions to support or oppose the recall petition, no can-
didate in the subsequent election other than the incumbent did so. However, 
the Board has never directly addressed the question. E-mail from Jonathan 
Becker, Adm’r, Wis. Gov. Accountability Bd., to Alex Fullman (June 22, 2012, 
1:11 PM) (on file with author). 
 Not only are Wis-
consin incumbents in the best situation to exploit the bifurcat-
ed campaign finance system, but the incumbent also benefits 
from automatic inclusion on the ballot for the election, as well 
 47. It is somewhat surprising that those in Wisconsin planning to run in 
the election, like Falk, did not take advantage of the period between the time 
it seemed certain the petition drive had been successful and the time the elec-
tion was certified to spend money on pro-recall ads designed also to benefit 
their campaigns; these activities could have been funded through unlimited 
contributions that could be accepted even after this period. See supra note 45 
and accompanying text (discussing the open language of the statute governing 
the recall finances statute); see also Memorandum from Kevin J. Kennedy, su-
pra note 44 (indicating that unlimited contributions could continue to be col-
lected if recall-related debts existed after an election order was entered). 
 48. Steven Yaccino, Wisconsin Democrats Choose Challenger to Run 
Against Governor in Recall Race, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A13. 
 49. This is an open question not addressed by the Government Accounta-
bility Board in any format, although the Board has opined that the target of a 
recall could defend his record in communications during the petition drive pe-
riod. See Telephone Interview with Jonathan Becker, supra note 34. 
 50. See Cain et al., supra note 7, at 28–30 (discussing some structural dif-
ferences and effects on incumbents). 
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as from the shorter time period for opponents to obtain signa-
tures to trigger a recall and the higher percentage of voter sig-
natures required. It seems likely that these structural ad-
vantages played some role in Scott Walker’s becoming the first 
governor in the nation to withstand a recall attempt that quali-
fied for the ballot. 
As this description of the two systems indicates, both 
states have chosen to apply a bifurcated campaign finance sys-
tem of contribution limits, although in different ways. Moreo-
ver, many players with different characteristics relevant to the 
regulatory system are affected by the rules: committees focused 
on the recall effort but not affiliated with the officeholder or 
prospective candidates; committees ostensibly focused on the 
recall effort but affiliated with declared candidates or people 
with ambitions for the office; campaign committees controlled 
by candidates; and independent committees focused on the 
candidate elections but unaffiliated with any particular candi-
date. In the next section, I will discuss whether regulation oth-
er than disclosure could be more broadly applied to some of 
these players, and how the Court’s recent holding in Citizens 
United might affect that analysis. 
II.  CITIZENS UNITED AND THE PERMISSIBLE 
REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN 
RECALL ELECTIONS   
The campaign finance systems governing recalls in both 
California and Wisconsin are bifurcated using the same princi-
ple: the campaign finance regime that governs initiative cam-
paigns applies to the parts of the recall campaign that are fo-
cused only on the question of the recall, and the campaign 
finance regime that applies generally to candidate elections ap-
plies to the parts of the recall campaign focused on the election 
of a replacement. Of course, the recall process itself is not so 
neatly bifurcated; unlike a ballot measure which is primarily 
targeted at a political issue, a recall is entirely focused on re-
moving a public official from office and replacing her with an-
other candidate. Every recall is explicitly candidate-focused. 
Thus, one could envision a system of contribution limitations 
that would apply throughout the process, derived from the 
model of candidate elections. Such a regulatory approach would 
apply contribution limits to any committee controlled by an of-
ficeholder or candidate, whether or not focused on the question 
of recall, and might well seek to extend those limits to all com-
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mittees formed to support the recall, whether or not associated 
with a candidate.  
Many cities in California have adopted campaign finance 
regimes that apply contribution limits much more broadly than 
either California or Wisconsin do at the state level. In Califor-
nia, localities can adopt different systems because the bifurcat-
ed system of recall-focused campaign finance regulation at the 
state level is a matter of statute, not a constitutional command. 
The Political Reform Act lists recall within the definition of a 
ballot measure: the “issue” to be placed on the ballot is the 
question whether or not to recall the targeted official.51 Thus, 
the state campaign finance regime in place for ballot measures 
applies to political committees opposing or supporting the re-
call. In addition, the statute provides that any state officer who 
is the target of a recall may establish a committee to oppose the 
recall and that committee will not be subject to contribution 
limitations generally applicable to candidate committees.52 
However, the Political Reform Act explicitly allows a local ju-
risdiction to impose “additional requirements on any person if 
the requirements do not prevent the person from complying 
with this title.”53
California’s regulatory body that applies the Political Re-
form Act, the Fair Political Practices Committee (FPPC), has 
interpreted this statutory scheme to allow local jurisdictions to 
impose a more extensive system of contribution limits in their 
recall elections than apply at the state level. If the locality has 
no campaign finance ordinance, the FPPC indicated that a re-
call is more like a ballot measure than a candidate election and 
thus contributions made in connection with the recall are not 
subject to contribution limitations.
  
54 However, the FPPC has 
also determined that cities have the ability to add more contri-
bution limits to recall elections, including limits that are more 
stringent, i.e., lower than state limits, through their city char-
ters.55
 
 51. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82043 (West 2005). 
 For example, before Citizens United, the FPPC found 
permissible under the Political Reform Act a city’s decision to 
apply a limit of $250 per person for donations made to any can-
didate or committee associated with a local recall election, in-
 52. Id. § 85315. 
 53. Id. § 81013. 
 54. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, Cohen Advice Letter, No. I-96-
364 (Feb. 18, 1997), available at 1997 WL 141951. 
 55. GOV’T § 85706. 
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cluding the officeholder and committees formed to support or 
oppose the recall, whether or not a candidate controlled them.56 
Several cities in California have adopted campaign finance or-
dinances that impose relatively low contribution restrictions on 
recall committees and officeholders, as well as replacement 
candidates, and that apply those restrictions from an early 
stage in the campaign, such as the filing of a notice of intent to 
circulate a recall petition.57
That more far-reaching systems of contribution limitations 
have been proposed and adopted for these hybrid elections is 
not surprising. However, the question is where the line be-
tween permissible regulation and unconstitutional burden lies 
under current jurisprudence. To determine that, I will assess a 
variety of recall actors: targeted incumbent officeholders during 
the recall process as well as during the replacement election; 
candidates during the replacement election; recall committees 
associated with public officials or potential candidates and act-
ing during the petition drive; and recall committees unaffiliated 
with officeholders and candidates at any point in the recall pro-
cess. The state interest that any contribution limit must vindi-
cate to survive a constitutional challenge is the Court’s current 
narrow conception of quid pro quo corruption: “dollars for polit-
ical favors,”
 
58 not mere “influence over or access to elected offi-
cials.”59
A. CONTRIBUTIONS TO TARGETED OFFICEHOLDERS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE RECALL 
 
Applying contribution limits that govern regular candidate 
elections to an officeholder running as a candidate in a recall 
election is unproblematic. Scott Walker’s campaign to retain of-
fice during the recall primary and recall general elections was 
just like a regular campaign except for the timing. The harder 
issue arises in California where the officeholder cannot run in 
the replacement election but must oppose the recall, and in 
 
 56. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, Angus Advice Letter, No. A-97-
173 (June 10, 1997), available at 1997 WL 329640. 
 57. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 27.2903, .2935 (amended 
Nov. 27, 2012); UKIAH, CAL., CITY CODE §§ 2079, 2080 (adopted June 14, 
2006); PETALUMA, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 1.30.030, .035 (amended Dec. 16, 
2004); SANTA ROSA, CAL., CITY CODE §§ 10-34.040, .060 (amended Sept. 16, 
2003). 
 58. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (quoting FEC v. 
Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). 
 59. Id. 
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Wisconsin for expenses incurred during the period before a re-
call election is ordered. If contributions to a re-election cam-
paign committee can give rise to quid pro quo corruption or the 
appearance of such, contributions to a committee controlled by 
the officeholder seeking to avoid or defeat a recall are the func-
tional equivalents and pose a similar danger. Regardless of the 
posture of the officeholder in this portion of the election, he is 
acting to retain his position just as he would in a re-election 
campaign. In the California situation, the only way he can re-
tain office is to defeat the recall. Interestingly, the Political Re-
form Act includes “any officeholder who is the subject of a recall 
election” in the definition of a “candidate”60 (but then treats 
that candidate differently from others with respect to campaign 
contributions61
The absence of contribution limits on the officeholder in 
Wisconsin during the petition circulation drive is particularly 
problematic because his potential opponents have no effective 
mechanism through which to pursue unlimited contributions. 
Although theoretically they could form pro-recall committees 
during the petition circulation drive, none did so in the 2012 
election,
). 
62
 
 60. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82007 (West 2005). 
 likely because the benefit of such activity at this ear-
ly stage was seen as minimal. On the other hand, because the 
Wisconsin governor is sure he will be running in any recall 
campaign (he qualifies automatically for the ballot), he can con-
fidently use the first period of the recall to begin his campaign 
early. Certainly, one of his best arguments against the recall 
petition is that he is governing ably and should retain his posi-
tion; that will be the same argument he makes once the elec-
tion is ordered and other candidates enter the race. This ability 
to campaign early is an inevitable characteristic of a recall elec-
tion, but it need not be augmented by a regulatory regime that 
allows the incumbents to raise unlimited amounts of money for 
weeks before any other candidate can effectively begin to accu-
 61. Id. § 85315(a) (“An elected state officer may accept campaign contribu-
tions to oppose the qualification of a recall measure, and if qualification is suc-
cessful, the recall election, without regard to the campaign contributions lim-
its . . . .”). 
 62. See Committee to Recall Walker, WIS. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD, 
http://gab.wi.gov/node/2100 (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (indicating that the 
petition circulation drive lasted from November 15, 2011 to January 17, 2012); 
View Registrants, WIS. CAMPAIGN FIN. INFO. SYS., http://cfis.wi.gov/Public/ 
Registration.aspx?page=RegistrantList (select “Recall” under “Registrant 
Type” and click “Search”) (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (displaying no pro-recall 
candidate committees). 
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mulate a political war chest—an activity that will be restricted 
by contribution limits. 
In short, throughout the entire recall process, not only is it 
permissible under current jurisprudence to apply contribution 
limitations to any committees associated with the incumbent 
officeholder, but such limits are necessary to ensure fair compe-
tition, particularly in Wisconsin. Although one can defend a re-
call structure designed to provide some benefits to the incum-
bent given the disruptive nature of a mid-term election, to 
allow only the incumbent to raise unlimited amounts of money, 
while restricting opponents in their ability to compete along 
this crucial dimension, skews the system unjustly. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS TO CANDIDATES DURING THE ELECTION FOR 
A REPLACEMENT 
In both states, the candidates, other than the officeholder, 
running in any election to replace the recalled official are sub-
ject to the same contribution limits that would apply in a regu-
larly scheduled election. In Wisconsin, the election is essential-
ly the same as a regular election—with typical ballot access 
procedures, provision for primaries, and a general election—so 
it is not surprising that the same campaign finance rules apply. 
In California, those running in the second part of the election 
are “candidates” for purposes of the Political Reform Act;63
The more interesting question that arises in California is 
whether the state can constitutionally limit contributions made 
to pro-recall committees that are controlled by replacement 
candidates. Currently, the ability to have two committees oper-
ating simultaneously throughout the election—one focused on 
the election and one ostensibly on the issue of the recall—
allows for evasion of the limits applied to campaign commit-
tees. Sophisticated candidates and consultants can comply with 
any rules shaping the content of ads funded by the pro-recall 
committee and still ensure all communications benefit the can-
didate’s chances of election. In McConnell v. FEC, the Court 
recognized that some campaign finance regulations could be 
justified as preventing circumvention of contribution limits im-
 
however, unlike the target of a recall, they are not expressly 
excluded from the contribution limits that the statute imposes 
on candidates for office. 
 
 63. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82007 (West 2005) (defining “candidate” generally 
to be “an individual who is listed on the ballot . . . for nomination for or elec-
tion to any elective office”). 
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posed elsewhere in the comprehensive scheme.64
Indeed, the close connection between the pro-recall activity 
of a candidate-controlled committee and the candidate’s own 
electoral fate provides sufficient justification for contribution 
limits that apply to both committees. If the recall campaign fi-
nance system is changed to limit contributions to the commit-
tees of the targeted officeholder throughout the process—not 
just during the replacement campaign as occurs now in Wis-
consin—then shutting down the spigot of unlimited donations 
to pro-recall committees of other candidates is required to en-
sure fair competition. Again, none of this regulation should be 
constitutionally problematic: recalls are truly hybrid elections 
that are focused mostly on candidates and officeholders. All the 
committees associated with those seeking the targeted position 
are essentially candidate committees: their focus is not on en-
acting a particular policy, as occurs in a ballot measure cam-
paign. They are focused on office holding, and large donations 
to any committees involved in any aspect of the recall and asso-
ciated directly with a candidate raise the specter of political fa-
vors for money, undermining people’s faith in democratic insti-
tutions. 
 Evasion of 
permissible contribution limits imposed to combat quid pro quo 
corruption and the appearance of such is facilitated, and likely 
encouraged, when the two committees are able to operate sim-
ultaneously and target their activities to influence the same 
election which is primarily about who will hold state office. 
C. RECALL COMMITTEES ACTIVE DURING THE PETITION DRIVE 
AND ASSOCIATED WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR POTENTIAL 
CANDIDATES OTHER THAN THE TARGET 
During the petition drive period, four types of committees 
can be involved. I have already discussed those controlled by 
the target of the recall and declared candidates; I will assess 
those entirely unaffiliated with any public official or potential 
candidate in the next subsection. The other two kinds of com-
mittees are those controlled by potential candidates and those 
controlled by current public officials. Of course, there is overlap 
here because many of the current officials involved in the recall 
effort likely have plans to run in the replacement election 
should the recall succeed. Certainly, that was true at first of 
 
 64. 540 U.S. 93, 170–71 (2003) (noting anti-circumvention rationale in the 
context of regulation of state and local parties). 
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Representative Issa in California,65 and one of the leading 
Democratic candidates to oppose Scott Walker, Milwaukee 
Mayor Tom Barrett. However, Kathleen Falk, the other serious 
Democratic contender, did not hold public office at the time of 
the recall, having served as Dane County Executive until 2010 
and run unsuccessfully in the past for governor and attorney 
general.66 The ultimate victor in California, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, had never sought public office before, but had 
been involved in politics through the initiative process.67 Alt-
hough Falk was clearly a candidate during the petition drive 
period, Schwarzenegger made his decision to run only after the 
recall petition succeeded.68
The question of regulating contributions to the committees 
controlled by public officials is somewhat different. Contribu-
tions to these committees can give rise to the appearance of 
quid pro quo corruption not just because some are likely plan-
ning a run in the replacement campaign, but because as sitting 
public officials they are susceptible to undue influence by large 
donors with respect to their actions in their current positions. If 
the public official deems it valuable to be involved in the recall 
petition drive period—as she must if she is spending money to 
influence the outcome—then presumably large donations to 
that effort give rise to the same sort of quid pro quo corruption 
or appearance of such that can justify contribution limits under 
current jurisprudence. The Court upheld restrictions on federal 
 In short, trying to craft a rule that 
would limit contributions to committees controlled by potential 
candidates is difficult. How do regulators know someone is a 
candidate before she has formally declared? If the rule applies 
only to those who have given some sort of legal notice of their 
candidacy—assuming that would be possible before the petition 
had been filed and an election scheduled—then potential can-
didates who are private parties will merely refrain as long as 
possible from taking the formal step. 
 
 65. See Bowler & Cain, supra note 20, at 5, 7. 
 66. See Steve Kornacki, Who’s Better to Beat Scott Walker?, SALON (Apr. 
29, 2012, 8:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/04/29/whos_better_to_beat_ 
scott_walker/singleton/. 
 67. ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, TOTAL RECALL: MY UNBELIEVABLY TRUE 
LIFE STORY 468–76 (2012) (describing his entry into California politics in 2002 
through sponsoring a ballot initiative supporting after-school education pro-
grams). 
 68. See JOE MATHEWS, THE PEOPLE’S MACHINE: ARNOLD 
SCHWARZENEGGER AND THE RISE OF BLOCKBUSTER DEMOCRACY 131–41 
(2006).  
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officeholders’ involvement in soft money contributions in feder-
al, state, or local elections using similar reasoning.69
Thus, the legal argument for applying contribution limits 
to public official-controlled recall committees is even stronger 
than those made in the context of regulating similar commit-
tees involved in ordinary ballot measures. Others have argued 
persuasively that limits could be applied even in this broader 
context because public officials become involved in typical bal-
lot measures to aid their electoral chances or further their leg-
islative agenda; thus, contributions could be regulated on the 
basis of the actuality or appearance of quid pro quo corrup-
tion.
 Moreover, 
because a public official’s involvement in a recall petition is 
very likely motivated by her serious consideration of entering 
any replacement election, the benefit to her is almost certainly 
the same as that of a contribution to a committee involved di-
rectly in a candidate election: it makes it more likely she will 
win the office to which she aspires. 
70 In the wake of the California recall, the Fair Political 
Practices Commission adopted a regulation limiting contribu-
tions to a candidate-controlled ballot measure committee to the 
same amount as allowed to be contributed directly to the can-
didate’s campaign committee.71 These regulations were subse-
quently invalidated but on the ground that the FPPC exceeded 
its authority in adopting them, not because they were constitu-
tionally infirm.72
I will return to the issue of contribution limits on candi-
date-controlled ballot measure committees in the final part of 
this Article; for now, our attention is on the regulation of public 
official-controlled recall committees. The link to quid pro quo 
corruption is stronger in this context because the recall is close-
ly linked to a simultaneous candidate election, whereas a can-
didate or officeholder may be involved in a ballot measure at 
 
 
 69. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 181–84 (2003).  
 70. See CTR. FOR GOVERNMENTAL STUDIES, DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: 
SHAPING CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 294–96, 308 (2d ed. 
2008); Hank Dempsey, Comment, The “Overlooked Hermaphrodite” of Cam-
paign Finance: Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees in California 
Politics, 95 CAL. L. REV. 123, 163–66 (2007); see infra text accompanying notes 
109–20 (discussing possible regulation of candidate-controlled ballot measure 
committees). 
 71. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18530.9 (2004), invalidated by Citizens to 
Save Cal. v. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 145 Cal. App. 4th 736 
(2006). 
 72. See Citizens to Save Cal., 145 Cal. App. 4th at 751–52. 
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issue in a campaign in which she is not running for office, per-
haps because she is attempting to implement her policy agenda 
in this way. The latter type of contributions is arguably more 
like lobbying expenditures—typically not limited in amount but 
disclosed—than campaign contributions to the campaign com-
mittee of a candidate. Even in the case of ballot measures de-
signed to enhance a candidate’s electoral prospects—perhaps 
by affecting turnout or shaping the campaign debate in ways 
that favor the candidate73
The challenges facing a regulatory system that limits con-
tributions to public official-controlled recall committees during 
the petition drive, including the committee controlled by the in-
cumbent, are logistical, not constitutional. One challenge has 
been identified previously: the difficulty in determining at this 
early stage which actors in the petition drive who are not cur-
rently public officials might be contemplating a run for the of-
fice should the recall succeed. In Wisconsin, for example, had 
both leading Democratic contenders formed pro-recall commit-
tees and spent money on recall activities before declaring 
themselves formal candidates, only one, Mayor Barrett, would 
have been affected by a system that applied only to sitting pub-
lic officials. This merely draws the line between limited and un-
limited contributions in a Wisconsin recall in a slightly differ-
ent place than does the currently bifurcated system, but in a 
place that still causes inequities among candidates. 
—the connection is somewhat less di-
rect than in the case of a recall. Success on the recall question 
is necessary, although not sufficient, for the election of the pub-
lic official to the new office, not merely helpful or influential. 
Second, regulators would have to determine what contribu-
tion limit to apply to any public official-controlled committee. 
For example, the regulations adopted by California’s FPPC for 
candidate-controlled ballot measure committees applied the 
contribution limit that would apply to the candidate’s campaign 
committee.74
 
 73. See Elizabeth Garrett, Direct Democracy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 137, 158–61 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Jo-
seph O’Connell eds., 2010) [hereinafter Garrett, Direct Democracy].  
 Thus, a governor involved in a ballot measure 
could have legally accepted larger donations than could a state 
representative. Using Wisconsin as an example, had a similar 
system been in place for recalls, Walker would have been able 
to accept donations up to $10,000 per individual, while Barrett 
 74. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18530.9. 
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would have been limited to $3,000 per individual.75 Solving this 
practical issue is easier in the context of recalls than ordinary 
ballot measures, however, because the limit can be tied to the 
office that is targeted in the recall, rather than the office held 
by the politician.76
D. INDEPENDENT RECALL COMMITTEES 
 This solution still poses some risk of circum-
venting lower contribution limits for certain political offices. If 
regulators believe the right limit for mayoral candidates is 
$3,000, for example, allowing donors to provide $10,000 to a re-
call committee that the mayor controls undermines that regula-
tory structure. Nonetheless, it is an evasion of much smaller 
magnitude than allowed in a system of unlimited contributions. 
In both gubernatorial campaigns, spending by groups for-
mally unaffiliated with any candidate was significant, but ar-
guably did not play as consequential a role as they do in other 
candidate elections. This occurred in large part because there 
were other avenues for raising unlimited direct contributions—
money that candidates vastly prefer and thus value more. In-
dependent expenditures related to the California gubernatorial 
election exceeded $10.5 million,77 a figure that was no doubt 
lower than it would have been had supporters of various candi-
dates not been able to contribute unlimited amounts directly to 
candidate-controlled recall committees. Total spending from all 
sources in the recall election was close to $80 million.78 Among 
the largest independent spenders were committees dominated 
by Indian tribes and unions, and most of those supported Lieu-
tenant Governor Cruz Bustamante, a Democratic contender to 
replace Governor Davis.79
 
 75. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.26(1)(a), (d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
 Independent spending occurred as 
well in the Wisconsin recall, particularly for candidates other 
 76. This is the approach adopted by California cities that limit contribu-
tions to recall committees; they adopt the limit that applies to the target office. 
See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 27.2935 (amended Nov. 27, 2012). 
 77. CAL. FAIR POL. PRACTICES COMM’N, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES: 
THE GIANT GORILLA IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE 10 (2008) [hereinafter INDEPEND-
ENT EXPENDITURES]. 
 78. Bowler & Cain, supra note 20, at 6. 
 79. See INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES, supra note 77, at 12, 13, 18 (de-
scribing First Americans for a Better California Independent Expenditure 
Committee, funded mostly by tribes and spending more than $4 million; 
Morongo Band of Mission Indians Native American Rights PAC, spending 
nearly $2.5 million for Republican contender Tom McClintock and nearly 
$500,000 for Bustamante; Community Civic Participation Project, funded 
mostly by unions and spending nearly $1 million for Bustamante). 
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than Governor Walker who did not raise money through unlim-
ited contributions for recall expenses. The more than $63 mil-
lion campaign set a record for political spending in Wisconsin, 
with about half of that raised by Walker directly.80 Unions pro-
vided significant funding for independent expenditures sup-
porting Democrat Tom Barrett, as did the Greater Wisconsin 
Political Expenditure Fund, which was supported by several in-
terest groups that traditionally back Democrats.81 In all, groups 
spent more than $30 million in independent expenditures or is-
sues ads throughout the entire recall campaign.82 While inde-
pendent expenditures constituted about half of all spending, 
both sides had a roughly even playing field along this dimen-
sion.83 It was the peculiar campaign finance structure of the re-
call process that provided a disproportionate advantage to the 
incumbent: Walker’s biggest fundraising advantage came from 
raising more than seven times as much as his Democratic op-
ponent through direct contributions.84
Although neither California nor Wisconsin applied contri-
bution limits to recall committees created without apparent 
candidate involvement, other campaign finance regimes for re-
calls do apply more broadly. For example, until 2012, the San 
Diego municipal code applied the $500 limit on contributions to 
candidates to “any committee for purposes of supporting or op-
posing the recall of that officeholder, regardless of whether 
such payment is made before, during, or after the circulation of 
a recall petition.”
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 80. Paul Abowd, Wisconsin Recall Breaks Record Thanks to Outside Cash, 
HUFFINGTON POST (June 3, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2012/06/03/wisconsin-recall-unions_n_1565921.html. 
 Similarly, until invalidated by a federal 
 81. Forces explicitly supporting Walker or opposing Barrett spent nearly 
$9 million (split fairly evenly between the two aligned positions), while those 
opposing Walker and (much less frequently) supporting Barrett spent nearly 
$10.9 million. Data available from WIS. CAMPAIGN FIN. INFO. SYS., http://cfis 
.wi.gov/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013). Overall independent spending was greater 
when one includes money spent for all candidates and issue ads. 
 82. See Abowd, supra note 80; Phil Hirschkorn & Nancy Cordes, A Record 
Amount of Money Spent on Wisconsin Recall, CBS NEWS (June 7, 2012, 11:45 
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57448678-503544/a-record-
amount-of-money-spent-on-wisconsin-recall/. 
 83. See supra note 81. 
 84. See The Wisconsin Recall’s Big Money, WASH. POST (June 6, 2012, 8:38 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-wisconsin-recalls-big-money/ 
2012/06/06/gJQAKAyiJV_graphic.html (using data through May 21, 2012). 
 85. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 27.2935(b) (effective through 2012). In 
November 2012, citing Citizens United and a related case in the Ninth Circuit, 
Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2011), the San Diego 
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court, the state of Washington applied statutory limits to con-
tributions to political committees that made expenditures in a 
recall election.86
In the wake of Citizens United, however, the courts have 
held that independent expenditure committees cannot constitu-
tionally be subject to limitations on contributions, including in 
the context of a recall. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion stat-
ed, without equivocation, that independent expenditures “do 
not give rise to corruption.”
  
87 He went on: “The appearance of 
influence or access . . . will not cause the electorate to lose faith 
in our democracy. . . . In fact, there is only scant evidence that 
independent expenditures even ingratiate. . . . Ingratiation and 
access, in any event, are not corruption.”88 Following this rea-
soning, the D.C. Court of Appeals has found no acceptable state 
interest to justify limiting contributions to entities making in-
dependent expenditures in federal campaigns.89 In 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, a unanimous court held that “because 
Citizens United holds that independent expenditures do not 
corrupt or give the appearance of corruption as a matter of law, 
then the government can have no anti-corruption interest in 
limiting contributions to independent expenditure-only organi-
zations.”90
The same approach has been used in two cases related to 
spending independent of candidates in recall campaigns. Strik-
ing down Wisconsin’s $10,000 contribution limit with respect to 
independent expenditure-only committees in candidate elec-
tions at the state level, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
identified Citizens United as the controlling precedent.
 
91
 
city council amended its campaign ordinances to eliminate contribution limits 
on independent expenditure only committees, including ones active in recalls. 
It added the words “candidate-controlled” to modify committees. See San Die-
go, Cal., Ordinance O-20227 (Nov. 27, 2012), available at http://www.sandiego 
.gov/ethics/pdf/eccoamendments_121127.pdf. 
 The 
political action committee that challenged the contribution lim-
itations was eager to engage in political activity related to the 
 86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.405(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013). 
But see Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding a 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of § 42.17A.405(3) as unconsti-
tutional). 
 87. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010). 
 88. Id. at 909–10. 
 89. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 90. Id. at 696. 
 91. Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 
139, 154 (7th Cir. 2011). 
  
1678 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:1654 
 
nine Wisconsin senators who had to run in recall elections the 
year before Walker faced his recall threat. Although the court 
did not apply any analysis specific to recalls, probably because 
the anticipated spending was directed at the candidate election 
following a successful petition drive, its reasoning would apply 
to any spending that is independent from a candidate during 
any part of a recall. Characterizing the holding in Citizens 
United relating to independent expenditures as “categorical,”92 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that “after Citizens United there 
is no valid governmental interest sufficient to justify imposing 
limits on fundraising by independent-expenditure organiza-
tions.”93
The Ninth Circuit focused more particularly on independ-
ent recall committees in Farris v. Seabrook, and reached the 
same conclusion, invalidating contribution limits that Wash-
ington had applied to political committees making expenditures 
in a recall election.
 
94 The State of Washington prohibited con-
tributions in excess of $800 to a political committee spending 
money in the recall election for a county official.95 The court ex-
plicitly drew the comparison between recall committees unaffil-
iated with candidates and independent expenditure-only com-
mittees in regular candidate elections. Holding that both “have 
at most a tenuous relationship with candidates,” it also noted 
that the state statutes governing the two types of committees 
provided similar structures to the organizations.96 The appel-
late court noted that the Court in Citizens United concluded 
explicitly that independent expenditures could not give rise to 
quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of such.97
The recall system in Washington is different from the sys-
tems in California and Wisconsin because a successful recall 
triggers an appointment of a successor by a designated gov-
ernmental entity, not a successor election.
 
98
 
 92. Id. at 155. 
 Thus, the Washing-
 93. Id. at 154. 
 94. 677 F.3d 858, 867–69 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.405(3) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013). 
 96. Farris, 677 F.3d at 866–67. 
 97. Id. (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010)); see also 
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2826–
27 (2011) (“The candidate-funding circuit is broken [in the case of independent 
expenditures]. The separation between candidates and independent expendi-
ture groups negates the possibility that independent expenditures will result 
in the sort of quid pro quo corruption with which our case law is concerned.”). 
 98. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.16.110 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013); see 
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ton process is somewhat less candidate-centered than a process 
that includes an election of a replacement; certainly, the office-
holder is implicated, but there are no contending candidates 
running for office either at the time of the recall or soon there-
after. Nonetheless, independent political committees actively 
making expenditures in all parts of recalls, but refraining from 
contributing to candidates, are mirror images of independent 
expenditure-only committees in typical candidate elections: if 
one cannot be restrained by contribution limits, then neither 
can the other. 
Before Citizens United, the Ninth Circuit had been more 
open to the possibility of limits on contributions to independent 
recall committees. An independent recall committee challenged 
the then-$250 limit in San Diego’s municipal code that applied 
to any committee opposing or supporting a recall of a city offi-
cial from the time of the petition drive through the election, re-
gardless of direct involvement by a candidate.99 The court ac-
cepted the possibility that the state interest in preventing quid 
pro quo corruption or the appearance of such might be present 
in a recall campaign—unlike, in its view, the possibility in a 
typical ballot measure campaign.100 However, it required some 
evidence of corruption or the potential of corruption specifically 
in the context of local recalls, and it intimated that general al-
legations of a “recent pattern of corrupt conduct in local poli-
tics” together with hypotheticals was not a sufficient empirical 
foundation to support the challenged ordinance.101
Whether or not a state can produce such evidence of cor-
ruption in state-level recalls, given their infrequency, is a diffi-
cult question; it might be an easier requirement to meet at the 
local level where recalls occur fairly regularly. However, in 
June 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court firmly closed the door on 
the possibility that specific evidence of corruption with respect 
to independent expenditures in candidate elections could sup-
port limits on contributions to committees engaging in that ac-
tivity.
 
102
 
also Farris, 677 F.3d at 867. 
 The Montana Supreme Court had upheld a state re-
striction on direct corporate spending for independent 
expenditures in candidate elections in part on the basis of a 
 99. Citizens for Clean Gov’t v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 649–50 
(9th Cir. 2007). 
 100. Id. at 652–53. 
 101. Id. at 653–54. 
 102. See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012). 
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long history of improper behavior by corporations in state elec-
tions.103 The Supreme Court summarily reversed the decision, 
declaring that there can be “no serious doubt” that Citizens 
United applies, and that “Montana’s arguments in support of 
the judgment below either were already rejected in Citizens 
United, or fail to meaningfully distinguish that case.”104 Justice 
Breyer’s brief dissent highlighted that the position rejected by 
the majority was that the government could defend a re-
striction on independent expenditures (in this case made by 
corporations directly) on the basis of evidence “[g]iven the his-
tory and political landscape” that they had led to corruption in 
the jurisdiction.105
III.  IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
REGULATION   
 It is not a surprise, therefore, that in Farris, 
the Ninth Circuit after Citizens United did not offer Washing-
ton the possibility of supporting its contribution limit on recall 
committees with evidence of corruption, an approach quite dif-
ferent from its position only five years before. 
Others have argued that the current campaign finance ju-
risprudence leads to a system that draws lines that create poli-
cy tension: for example, regulating the supply of money in can-
didate elections (contributions) but not the demand 
(expenditures),106 and treating corporate independent expendi-
tures differently from corporate contributions.107
 
 103. See W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 11–13 
(2011). 
 The bifurcated 
campaign finance rules applied in the two recent gubernatorial 
recall campaigns similarly produce unfortunate policy conse-
quences. They allow the officeholder the ability to escape con-
tribution restrictions, although only for part of the campaign in 
Wisconsin. And in California, they allow all candidates an out-
let to accept unlimited contributions, substantially undermin-
ing the integrity of any restrictions applied to candidate com-
mittees. That raises the final question: Is there a way to 
approach campaign finance regulations so that a more effective 
and comprehensive system can be devised for our hybrid de-
 104. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. at 2491. 
 105. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 106. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH 
L. REV. 311, 311–15. 
 107. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 581, 615–17 (2011). 
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mocracy? I will first assess that question using the state inter-
est in preventing quid pro quo corruption as the guiding princi-
ple, then expand the perspective to consider a broader state in-
terest in avoiding corruption of the democratic system when 
money plays a disproportionate role in agenda-setting or out-
comes, and finally, and briefly, consider a system that relies on-
ly on aggressive disclosure laws. 
A. MORE SOPHISTICATED CONCEPTIONS OF QUID PRO QUO 
CORRUPTION 
Even with the relatively narrow conception of quid pro quo 
corruption favored by the Roberts Court, case law could support 
applying contribution limits to any committee controlled by an 
officeholder or candidate, thereby eliminating the loophole that 
allowed Gray Davis and Scott Walker to amass considerable po-
litical war chests through unlimited contributions and also 
gave many challengers in California a similar opportunity 
through their recall-focused committees. Because of the close 
connection between the success of the recall and the electoral 
fates of these politicians, the same danger of hard-to-prove but 
“pernicious practices” akin to bribery108
This analysis of committees in recalls also clarifies a 
broader point: contributions to ballot measure committees con-
trolled by politicians could be constitutionally subject to lim-
its.
 exists when candidates 
affected by a recall can evade contribution limits through di-
rectly controlled recall committees. 
109 Although traditional ballot measures might be less direct-
ly connected to an officeholder’s electoral fate than a recall 
measure, two relevant realities are now abundantly clear from 
the findings of social scientists studying direct democracy. 
First, politicians become deeply engaged in the initiative pro-
cess where hybrid democracy exists because that activity is 
likely to benefit them in concurrent candidate elections or it 
helps them implement their policy agenda, which in turn as-
sists them in any subsequent re-election effort. Not only does 
the presence of an initiative increase voter turnout,110
 
 108. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 but also 
 109. See Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking the Unconstitutionality of Contribu-
tion and Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 
885, 895 (2005) [hereinafter Hasen, Rethinking Unconstitutionality] (reaching 
a similar conclusion before Citizens United). 
 110. DANIEL A. SMITH & CAROLINE J. TOLBERT, EDUCATED BY INITIATIVE 
40–43 (2004) (noting that, in presidential elections, each initiative boosts 
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the topic of the initiative may motivate particular voters to 
come to the polls. Strategic candidates who can appear on the 
ballot with initiatives thus generate or back measures that will 
bring more voters to the polls who support them, and not simi-
larly motivate voters who might support their opponents.111 
Certainly, it is not difficult to make the argument that the rela-
tionship between a candidate running for office and a ballot 
measure committee she controls that is active with respect to 
an initiative on the same ballot provides a serious possibility of 
the quid pro quo corruption that the Roberts Court describes. 
This kind of candidate-controlled ballot measure committee is 
almost the same as a candidate-controlled recall committee, 
which I previously argued could easily be subject to contribu-
tion limits.112
In addition, once in office, politicians who are stymied in 
the traditional legislative process may turn to the ballot to suc-
ceed in their policy objectives. For example, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger began his term as governor successfully wield-
ing the initiative threat, using his popularity with the people 
and ability to raise money to support an initiative campaign to 
pressure the legislature into adopting workers’ compensation 
reform.
 
113 Current California governor Jerry Brown staked his 
political fortune to Proposition 30, a ballot initiative that raised 
income and sales taxes to help fund education and reduce the 
state’s monumental budget deficit.114 In both these examples, 
governors turned to the initiative process as a matter of choice 
(or perhaps political necessity in Brown’s case, given the un-
likelihood of getting a tax increase through the legislature115
 
turnout by 0.5%; in midterm elections, each initiative boosts turnout by 1.2%); 
see also Gregory B. Lewis, Same-Sex Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Elec-
tion, 38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 195, 195 (2005) (discussing the role of views on 
the issue of same-sex marriage, and the presence of initiatives, on the presi-
dential election in 2004). 
), 
 111. Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-
Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 950 
(2005) (terming such initiatives “crypto-initiatives” because they are drafted 
and pursued because of their spillover effects on a candidate election, not be-
cause of their policy consequences). 
 112. See supra Part II.C. 
 113. Garrett, California Recall, supra note 25, at 280. 
 114. See Jim Christie, Brown Pushes Tax Hike as California’s Money Woes 
Deepen, REUTERS (May 13, 2012, 8:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2012/05/14/us-usa-california-budget-idUSBRE84D00020120514 (calling it the 
“centerpiece of his fiscal plan”). 
 115. See S. CAL. ASS’N OF GOV’TS, SUMMARY OF THE NOVEMBER 6TH 
STATEWIDE BALLOT MEASURES (2012), available at http://www.scag.ca.gov/ 
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but in other instances, a politician must take his policy to the 
people because of constitutional requirements. In March 2004, 
for example, Schwarzenegger succeeded in gaining approval for 
a $15 billion deficit bond to answer the state’s ever-present fis-
cal woes; under the California Constitution, he was required to 
submit such a bond to a vote.116 Both governors embarked on 
aggressive fundraising for their efforts in the realm of direct 
democracy, using committees not subject to contribution limita-
tions, and often raising money simultaneously from the same 
funders of their re-election campaigns.117
Once the relationship between candidates’ political and 
electoral fortunes to certain ballot measures is understood, one 
simply cannot conclude that the initiative process is free from 
the dangers of quid pro quo corruption because there are no 
 Granted, these 
measures are somewhat removed from an actual candidate 
election in that neither Schwarzenegger nor Brown appeared 
on the ballot with these initiatives. Yet the success of the ballot 
measures was viewed as vital to the political success of their 
gubernatorial sponsors, playing a significant role in future elec-
tions. 
 
legislative/pdfs/library/November2012_StatewideBallotMeasuresSummary 
.pdf. This ballot measure was also structured as a constitutional amendment, 
which required a vote of the people. However, tax increases are not required to 
be submitted to the people, and Brown could probably have structured the 
proposal as a statute or statutory initiative (although it made some changes to 
local funding that required constitutional amendment). This structure may 
also have allowed Brown to gain higher ballot placement than a competing 
statutory tax increase proposal because the legislature also changed the ballot 
access law to require constitutional initiatives be placed first on the ballot. See 
Anthony York, Jerry Brown’s Tax Measure Faces Legal Challenge, L.A. TIMES 
(June 29, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/california-politics/ 
2012/06/jerry-brown-tax-measure-challenge-molly-munger.html. Proposition 
30 passed in November 2012, while the competing statutory initiative failed. 
Statement of Vote Summary Pages, CAL. SECRETARY ST., http://www.sos.ca 
.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/06-sov-summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 
2013) (showing Proposition 30 winning, with roughly 55% of the vote, and 
Proposition 38 failing, with only about 29% of the vote). 
 116. Garrett, California Recall, supra note 25, at 277–78, 281–83. 
 117. See id. at 281 (describing Schwarzenegger’s “California Recovery 
Team” system encouraging large donations to his ballot measure committee 
from supporters); Hasen, Rethinking Unconstitutionality, supra note 109, at 
900–01 (describing donors to the committee); David Siders, Jerry Brown 
Builds Political Operation to Win Tax Vote, Re-election, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Dec. 31, 2011, at 1A, available at http://www.sacbee.com/2011/12/31/v-print/ 
4154114/jerry-brown-builds-political-operation.html (noting that Brown’s ini-
tiative campaign had raised $1.2 million from just nine donors, including sev-
eral six-figure donations by interest groups). 
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politicians involved who might be corrupted.118 On the contrary, 
the importance of ballot measures to modern politicians is 
abundantly clear, and any campaign finance system that leaves 
committees they control unregulated is one that has little in-
tegrity because of the ease of circumvention. Thus, the current 
understanding of the state’s interest in avoiding quid pro quo 
corruption or its appearance could support a campaign finance 
system that applied contribution limits to candidate-controlled 
ballot measure and recall committees. Yet it is not clear that 
such a system—which is simply differently bifurcated than the 
current one—is sensible, as we saw in the analysis of recall 
elections. It leaves unregulated most ballot measure commit-
tees, because only a fraction are explicitly controlled by candi-
dates or politicians.119 It poses practical problems such as de-
termining the right contribution limit to apply when the 
politicians involved are themselves subject to varying limita-
tions depending on their office. It encourages politicians to rely 
on committees they do not expressly control, but are run by op-
eratives close to them and who share their views, much as is 
occurring now with Super PACs in the federal system.120
The Court’s strict adherence to the anticorruption interest 
leads to a bifurcated system in the context of recalls that draws 
the line between regulated and unregulated contributions in a 
way that is problematic—and the act of drawing the line is like-
ly to change behavior in a way that will make the unregulated 
 
 
 118. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 
296–99 (1981) (making this argument). 
 119. See Hasen, Rethinking Unconstitutionality, supra note 109, at 908 
(stating that, of the 622 ballot measure committees in California from 1990–
2004, only 40 were candidate-controlled); see also Dempsey, supra note 70, at 
145–48 (noting an increase in the number of such committees over time). 
 120. See Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1665–66 
(2012) [hereinafter Briffault, Super PACs]; see also Patrick O’Connor, Cam-
paigns Drop Clues to PACs, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB10001424052702303684004577509243899367240.html (detailing 
ways candidates communicate to super PACs without violating regulations); 
Super PACs: All the Speech Money Can Buy, WEEK (Dec. 9, 2011), http:// 
theweek.com/article/index/222222/all-the-speech-money-can-buy (reporting 
that American Crossroads, a Super PAC associated with GOP strategists Karl 
Rove and Ed Gillespie, announced plans to spend $240 million in 2012; and 
every candidate in the presidential race, including President Obama, has close 
aides leading Super PACs and committed to substantial independent spending 
to help elect their candidates). One committee crucial to Schwarzenegger’s bal-
lot measure success was controlled by a group that included former aides. See 
Peter Nicholas, Group to Aid Gov.’s Push for Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2005, at B1 (noting involvement by Joel Fox, who had worked for 
Schwarzenegger during the recall campaign). 
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behavior more troubling from the anticorruption perspective. 
That is, interests seeking influence over electoral outcomes and 
candidates will shift spending into the unregulated channels, a 
feature that has led Issacharoff and Karlan to term the system 
of campaign financing “hydraulic.”121 Given the vital im-
portance of money in successful petition drives and its influ-
ence in initiative campaigns,122 it strains credulity to maintain 
that politicians whose fates are affected by recalls or other bal-
lot measures will not be particularly attentive to those who 
provided the funding, even if the politician and group did not 
expressly coordinate their activities during the election itself. 
As Justice Thurgood Marshall observed in a similar context, 
applying a common sense understanding of politics: “Surely an 
eager supporter will be able to discern a candidate’s needs and 
desires; similarly, a willing candidate will notice the support-
er’s efforts.”123
The influence of such a supporter’s independent expendi-
tures becomes greater when other avenues of expressing finan-
cial support are constrained. In the modern gubernatorial re-
calls, independent expenditures were less consequential than in 
many federal and state campaigns because these candidate-
focused races had the unusual feature of permitting some can-
didates the opportunity to gather unlimited direct contribu-
tions. As I noted earlier,
  
124
Justice Kennedy’s categorical conclusion in Citizens United 
that independent expenditures can never pose a risk to the in-
 in the California recall, total inde-
pendent spending was a relatively small part of the total 
spending; in Wisconsin, it was about half of the total spending, 
but fairly evenly split, with the main funding advantage en-
joyed by the incumbent who had a way to raise money through 
unlimited contributions. If the avenue of unlimited direct con-
tributions were closed off, those seeking to deploy wealth to 
help candidates in recalls would certainly funnel much of that 
money to independent expenditures. Although such spending is 
a second-best alternative to candidates who in most instances 
would prefer direct control, independent expenditures are bet-
ter than losing the benefit of the money altogether. 
 
 121. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999). 
 122. See Garrett, Direct Democracy, supra note 73, at 147–50. 
 123. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 519–
20 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 124. See supra Part II.D. 
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tegrity of democratic institutions is not as naïve as it might ap-
pear on first reading or in the light of subsequent develop-
ments. Rather, his view is that preferential treatment and in-
creased access to politicians—the consequences of substantial 
amounts of targeted independent campaign spending—do not 
constitute quid pro quo corruption. He wrote in Citizens United: 
“The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will not 
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy . . . . The fact 
that a corporation, or any other speaker, is willing to spend 
money to try to persuade voters presupposes that the people 
have the ultimate influence over elected officials.”125 The flaws 
in his analysis are several: The empirical basis of his assertion 
that such an appearance does not undermine the public’s faith 
in the integrity of democratic institutions is not clear,126 and it 
seems likely that influence and preferential access, not actual 
bribes, are the root of the anticorruption interest that the Court 
believes can support limits on direct contributions.127
The thrust of his argument, however, is more persuasive. 
He believes that the problem with independent expenditures, if 
there is any, does not neatly fit into the notion of bribery-like 
quid pro quo corruption of dollars for concrete special benefits. 
This challenge to define precisely what is wrong with people 
and entities with wealth deploying substantial amounts in elec-
tions is one reason the Court struggled after Buckley to define 
quid pro quo corruption and to determine what level of evidence 
was required to sustain a government’s decision to regulate the 
campaign process.
 
128
 
 125. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010). 
 This difficulty suggests that limiting the 
government’s interest in regulating campaign finance to avoid-
ing bribery-like actions—which are not pervasive in the modern 
political context and can often be combatted deploying bribery 
laws directly—misses the point. Such a focus ignores one of the 
primary motivations behind campaign finance regulation in the 
recall context, and indeed throughout hybrid democracy: to 
 126. Very little empirical work exists. For an exception, see generally Na-
thaniel Persily & Kelli Lammie, Perceptions of Corruption and Campaign Fi-
nance: When Public Opinion Determines Constitutional Law, 153 U. PA. L. 
REV. 119 (2004) (studying public opinion concerning campaign finance reform). 
 127. See Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
118, 129–30 (2010) (discussing one kind of preferential access, clientelism, 
that leads to political corruption). 
 128. See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of 
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L.J. 147, 162–63 (2004); Michael S. 
Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 22–24 (2012). 
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seek to provide greater equality with respect to the opportunity 
to participate in the electoral process by reducing the role of 
money in determining political access.129
B. PROVIDING GREATER EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
 
Continuing disagreement among jurists and scholars about 
the legitimacy of some sort of egalitarian state interest that 
could constitutionally support campaign finance regulations is 
well known and amply discussed in the literature.130 A majority 
of the Court continues to eschew any such interest, making it 
clear in Citizens United that they strongly adhered to the rul-
ing in Buckley that the government has no acceptable interest 
in “equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to 
influence the outcome of elections.”131 The majority concluded 
that “[t]he rule that political speech cannot be limited based on 
a speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise 
that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression 
of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”132
 
 129. There may well be other state interests that could support more com-
prehensive campaign finance regulations than the courts current articulation 
of a particular kind of quid pro quo corruption, both in issue campaigns and 
candidate campaigns. I explore one interest here that is particularly compel-
ling in the context of direct democracy given its historical pedigree. 
 In con-
trast, dissenting justices over the decades have been willing to 
take seriously the demand of democratic principles that institu-
tional design address the role wealth plays in the political 
 130. See, e.g., Landell v. Sorrell, 406 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc), rev’d sub nom., 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); Richard Briffault, Public Funding and 
Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 576–78 (1999); Ronald Dworkin, 
The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19, 21; 
Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 1000–04 (2011); John S. Shockley, Direct Democra-
cy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and 
Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 377, 378–411 
(1985) (discussing political equality in the context of ballot measures); Sympo-
sium, Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1125 (1994) (focusing in 
particular on articles by David A. Strauss and Cass R. Sunstein). 
 131. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam)). 
 132. Id. at 905. The Court reaffirmed this position broadly in the recent 
case concerning public financing, a case that is notable because the state 
aimed to augment the speech of the less-well-financed candidate rather than 
restricting the ability of the wealthier candidate to spend money. See Ariz. 
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 
(2011). 
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realm and to consider reforms that attempt to ensure greater 
equality in political access. Most recently, that argument was 
advanced by Justice Stevens: “Minimizing the effect of concen-
trated wealth on our political process, and the concomitant in-
terest in addressing the dangers that attend the perception 
that political power can be purchased, are, therefore, sufficient-
ly weighty objectives to justify significant congressional ac-
tion.”133 Justice White had explicitly accepted such a justifica-
tion in the context of limiting corporate campaign expenditures 
relating to ballot measures. He wrote in dissent in Citizens 
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, “[r]ecognition that 
enormous contributions from a few institutional sources can 
overshadow the efforts of individuals may have discouraged 
participation in ballot measure campaigns and undermined 
public confidence in the referendum process.”134
In this Article, I will not further engage in this debate, 
which continues to rage, nor will I analyze at length why citi-
zens in a democracy are legitimately concerned when those 
with wealth have greater opportunity to influence electoral out-
comes or political decisions solely by virtue of their control over 
economic resources.
 
135 This apprehension has only grown in re-
cent years as economic developments have widened wealth ine-
quality in the country, a reality that likely has contributed to 
the enactment of policies that further entrench disparities. For 
this analysis inspired by the structures of recalls, the key ob-
servation is that adoption of the mechanisms of direct democra-
cy—including the recall—was driven in large part by progres-
sives who convinced voters that monied interests had too much 
influence over state and local legislative agendas and political 
outcomes.136
 
 133. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 756 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 Contrary to Justice Kennedy’s blithe assertion that 
 134. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 308 
(1981) (White, J., dissenting). 
 135. For my views, see Elizabeth Garrett, New Voices in Politics: Justice 
Marshall’s Jurisprudence on Law and Politics, 52 HOW. L.J. 655, 669–82 
(2009) (discussing the equality rationale in the context of candidate elections 
and the opinion in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990)). 
 136. See, e.g., Kira L. Klatchko, The Progessivist Origins of the 2003 Cali-
fornia Gubernatorial Recall, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 701, 702–03 (2004) (dis-
cussing one recall in particular); Joshua Spivak, California’s Recall: Adoption 
of the “Grand Bounce” for Elected Officials, 82 CAL. HIST. 20, 22–25 (2004). 
Certainly, there are other factors responsible for the successful adoption of 
these mechanisms in particular states. For literature identifying some of these 
factors, see Amy Bridges & Thad Kousser, Where Politicians Gave Power to the 
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“the appearance of influence or access . . . will not cause the 
electorate to lose faith in our democracy,”137
This egalitarian vision of a well-functioning hybrid democ-
racy, can also shape the regulatory structure that accompanies 
the tools of direct democracy, including campaign finance regu-
lations that apply in elections concerning ballot measures and 
recalls. This motivation is broader than a narrow conception of 
bribery-like quid pro quo corruption; it is a concern about the 
negative consequences on policy that arise from the dispropor-
tionate influence enjoyed by actors deploying large sums of 
money amassed because of economic prowess rather than the 
power of their political ideas. It then follows that the campaign 
finance system put into place to further that broader interest 
would regulate more than the money raised by candidates; it 
would also apply to groups making independent expenditures. 
Accepting some articulation of this equality of opportunity in-
terest as a legitimate basis for regulation might convince courts 
to leave in place campaign finance systems that did not draw 
the line at candidate-controlled committees but that sought to 
regulate more comprehensively, particularly in the context of 
recall, initiative, and popular referendum elections. 
 it was precisely 
that appearance, and the underlying reality that such access 
shaped the policy agenda and political outcomes, that provided 
the impetus for the recall, the initiative, and the popular refer-
endum. In the eyes of voters who supported hybrid democracy, 
a system that allowed wealth, particularly but not exclusively 
corporate wealth, to frequently determine state policy lacked 
integrity and was profoundly corrupt. 
If courts consider political equality a legitimate state inter-
est, more extensive campaign finance regulations could with-
stand judicial scrutiny. It does not mean, however, that all 
states and localities would adopt systems that would apply be-
yond the current contours of state regulation. Even now Cali-
fornia, where the recall and replacement elections occur simul-
 
People: Adoption of the Citizen Initiative in the U.S. States, 11 ST. POL. & 
POL’Y Q. 167 (2011); Daniel A. Smith & Dustin Fridkin, Delegating Direct De-
mocracy: Interparty Legislative Competition and the Adoption of the Initiative 
in American States, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 333, 335–42 (2008); see also Dennis 
F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making Campaigns Safe for De-
mocracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036, 1047–49 (2005) (making the point 
about this kind of electoral corruption more broadly). 
 137. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910; see also Hasen, Rethinking Uncon-
stitutionality, supra note 109, at 907–14 (discussing evidence that voter confi-
dence in democratic institutions is undermined by the appearance of unequal 
influence). 
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taneously, regulators could limit contributions to the target of 
the recall; the barrier to that is only state statute, not the state 
or federal constitution. Moreover, California could change its 
statutory scheme to limit the ability of any candidate to set up 
separate recall-focused fundraising operations during the elec-
tion, just as Wisconsin does now. California has chosen not to 
extend its regulatory structure to that extent, and it is likely 
that other jurisdictions would not accept the invitation to regu-
late to the greatest extent allowed. A less aggressive judiciary 
allows states and localities to experiment with a variety of reg-
ulatory schemes, tailoring them to particular realities of the po-
litical environment and learning from experience both in the 
jurisdiction and in other locations.138
Of course, more judicial deference may also permit legisla-
tors to adopt regulations designed to serve less laudable goals; 
for example, there is ample reason to believe that incumbent 
legislators shape democratic institutions, including campaign 
finance rules, to entrench themselves in office and make suc-
cessful election challenges exceedingly difficult.
 
139 One strongly 
suspects that the provision in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act that Justice Stevens defended on egalitarian grounds140—
the so-called Millionaire’s Amendment that allowed higher con-
tribution limits for candidates facing opponents who spent 
large amounts of their personal wealth on their campaigns141—
may have garnered many votes in Congress because it would 
protect incumbents from wealthy, self-financed challengers, the 
kind of challenger most likely to unseat an incumbent.142
 
 138. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? Courts and the Political Pro-
cess, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 130–52 (arguing for judicial modesty in the arena 
of law and politics).  
 Simi-
 139. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as 
Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 
(1998) (suggesting that parties lock up political processes to thwart competi-
tion); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment 
Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997) (proposing a theory of judicial review which 
addresses anti-majoritarian policies). 
 140. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 749–57 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 141. 2 U.S.C. § 441a-1(a) (2006), invalidated by Davis, 554 U.S. at 743–44. 
 142. Jennifer A. Steen, Self-Financed Candidates and the “Millionaires’ 
Amendment”, in THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLITICS, AND THE 
BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 204, 206–07 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 
2006). During the brief time the provision was in effect, it had little impact 
and was not used by many incumbents because of the additional requirement 
that the self-funded candidate significantly outraise his opponent. Id. at 209–
15; see also Richard Briffault, Davis v. FEC: The Roberts Court’s Continuing 
Attack on Campaign Finance Reform, 44 TULSA L. REV. 475, 480–82 (2009). 
  
2013] HYBRID REALM OF RECALL ELECTIONS 1691 
 
larly, it should not surprise us that some of the supporters of 
severe contribution limits during petition drives on independ-
ent recall committees in San Diego were the incumbent city of-
ficials who would be the targets of such recalls.143
Interestingly, one answer to the entrenchment critique—
one that applies forcefully in a system where the regulated is 
also the regulator—is that hybrid democracy provides avenues 
to adopt reforms to institutional design that bypass elected offi-
cials. One of the motivations behind the adoption of the initia-
tive was to reduce the power wielded by self-interested legisla-
tors and party elites who used their office to block reforms that 
would empower ordinary citizens.
 Remember 
that the volunteer effort that succeeded in obtaining sufficient 
signatures to trigger a recall election of Governor Walker in 
Wisconsin is unique; usually, money—and lots of it—is neces-
sary to pass the high hurdle of the petition drive. 
144 Direct democracy therefore 
allows voters to determine how to structure institutions, includ-
ing campaign finance rules that apply to candidate and ballot 
measure campaigns. Even scholars who are generally skeptical 
about direct democracy have been willing to support a role for 
this decision-making mechanism with regard to the design of 
democratic institutions in light of the inevitable conflict of in-
terest that besets legislators.145 One of the primary differences 
in democratic institutions that can be observed when compar-
ing initiative states to non-initiative states is that the former 
are more likely to provide public financing for legislative offic-
es.146
 
See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Laura Miller, Democracy and Electoral 
Processes, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW, su-
pra note 
 One challenge to using direct democracy to alter the fea-
tures of democratic institutions is that the current campaign 
finance rules allow unlimited spending and unlimited contribu-
73, at 173, 189 (arguing that spending limits may aid incumbents by 
impeding their challengers’ efforts to gain name-recognition).  
 143. Not only is the author aware of the situation in San Diego because of 
her involvement in the litigation, but this reality is alluded to in Citizens for 
Clean Government v. City of San Diego, 474 F.3d 647, 647 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 144. Garrett, Direct Democracy, supra note 73, at 162. 
 145. See, e.g., Dennis F. Thompson, The Role of Theorists and Citizens in 
Just Elections: A Response to Professors Cain, Garrett, and Sabl, 4 ELECTION 
L.J. 153, 158–60 (2005). 
 146. See Nathaniel Persily & Melissa Cully Anderson, Regulating Democ-
racy through Democracy: The Use of Direct Legislation in Election Law Re-
form, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 997, 1003–04 (2005). See generally John Pippen et al., 
Election Reform and Direct Democracy: Campaign Finance Regulations in the 
American States, 30 AM. POL. RES. 559 (2002) (measuring the relationship be-
tween direct democracy and campaign finance limits). 
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tions during the campaigns because the judiciary continues to 
adhere to a narrow conception of corruption when analyzing 
campaign finance rules and, at least up to now, has failed to 
understand the important role candidates and officeholders 
play in the initiative and referendum process. Thus, the forces 
that wish to preserve the power of money to influence electoral 
outcomes can forcefully deploy those resources to oppose any 
reform even when the people have the outlet of direct democra-
cy. 
Arguments based on the principle of equality of opportuni-
ty to participate in politics regardless of economic wealth de-
rived from the history of direct democracy would support great-
er regulation of campaign contributions and expenditures in 
recalls and ballot measure campaigns. However, such rules 
would presumably be quickly rejected under current Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. Thus, we are left with some sort of bifur-
cated system, one that allows ample opportunity for entities 
and individuals with wealth to spend money to obtain influ-
ence, access, and favorable political outcomes. Given that such 
a system allows substantial gaps in regulatory coverage, fun-
neling money into some streams—such as independent expend-
itures—and limiting its flow in others—such as direct contribu-
tions to candidates and their campaign committees—it is worth 
briefly describing a different, more consistent regulatory land-
scape that is increasingly attractive to reformers and would 
likely withstand judicial scrutiny. One answer to the difficul-
ties of sensible campaign finance regulation under current 
rules would be to remove the restrictions entirely and focus on 
well-crafted disclosure laws aimed to provide voters credible 
and helpful information. 
C. DISCLOSURE AS A COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
SYSTEM 
One way to ameliorate any unfortunate effects of a bifur-
cated system of contribution limits in recalls, and possibly bal-
lot measure campaigns should a jurisdiction seek to apply lim-
its to candidate-controlled committees, would be to eliminate 
all limits and regulate only through disclosure of the source 
and amount of campaign-related funds. Although under in-
creased challenge, campaign finance disclosure laws have 
largely survived judicial scrutiny, both in the context of candi-
date and ballot measure campaigns. Even in environments 
where the Court does not acknowledge a risk of corruption—
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direct democracy and now independent expenditures in candi-
date elections—it has been willing to leave disclosure laws in 
place because they serve the governmental interest in provid-
ing voters information about the entities behind election-
related communications, which then allows them to better 
evaluate the arguments being made.147 In addition, California 
courts have recognized that the identities of some donors act as 
a voting cue when voters know whether or not their interests 
are aligned with the donors’ and can gauge the intensity of the 
donors’ position through the amount of the financial commit-
ment.148 This informational interest has become more weighty 
in light of ample evidence that some groups and individuals are 
seeking to avoid publicity about their involvement in cam-
paigns by organizing under misleading names or routing spend-
ing through several organizations, some of which may face few-
er disclosure requirements.149
One insight provided by the analysis of campaign finance 
rules in the context of recalls is that disclosure laws can be 
supported not only by the informational interest but also by the 
traditional quid pro quo corruption interest, at least with re-
spect to ballot measures, including recalls, that include candi-
date involvement. This should strengthen the case for effective 
disclosure laws, aimed to provide complete information to vot-
ers and to pierce any veils that groups create, as they are in-
creasingly under attack by those who seek to dismantle any 
type of regulatory structure governing campaigns.  
 
As they become the only regulatory response likely to with-
stand judicial scrutiny, disclosure laws have become the subject 
of more scholarly analysis. Again, I do not intend to provide a 
lengthy analysis of disclosure laws here, but the perspective 
gained from the analysis of recall elections allows for a few ob-
servations. 
First, given the importance of money in petition drives, 
disclosure of the forces behind the drive and the amount of 
 
 147. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)) (allowing disclosure with respect to 
independent expenditures that could not be subject to contribution limits); 
First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978) (supporting 
disclosure in ballot measure campaigns). 
 148. ProtectMarriage.com v. Bowen, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1208–09 (E.D. 
Cal. 2009). For a discussion of voting cues in direct democracy, see Garrett, 
Direct Democracy, supra note 73, at 151–55. 
 149. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 
U.S. 93, 197 (2003)). 
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money they are spending is vital to serve voters’ informational 
needs. Thus, disclosure must begin early in the process and oc-
cur regularly and in a timely way so that voters can learn about 
the groups involved as the petitions are circulated. Information 
should also be provided in ways designed to catch voters’ atten-
tion. For example, petitions could include in large print de-
signed to be noticeable the identities of groups providing the 
funding behind the signature gathering effort. Disclosure laws 
could also require that petition signers initial a disclaimer re-
vealing the financial interests to ensure that it was at least 
brought to their attention. As these laws are drafted or refined, 
more empirical work is required to determine whether this in-
formation affects voter behavior during the circulation period 
or on Election Day. 
Second, petition circulators should also be required to wear 
badges indicating whether they are paid circulators or volun-
teers. Although the Court has ruled unconstitutional a re-
quirement that circulators wear name badges,150 a tag with the 
status of either paid or volunteer does not present the same 
dangers for intimidation or harassment. Yet it provides useful 
information about the intensity of any grassroots support for 
the topic of the petition. When the tools of direct democracy 
were designed in the early twentieth century, the signature 
gathering stage was to be an effective threshold that regulated 
ballot access, allowing only those topics that could garner a 
significant amount of grassroots support. Now that money 
guarantees ballot access, the only petition drives that actually 
provide good evidence of popular support are those using volun-
teers—in that case, the volunteer workers provide the evidence, 
not the signatories.151 Several states currently require that the 
petition identify whether the circulator is paid.152
 
 150. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 200–04 
(1999) (leaving undecided any constitutional issues relating to tags identifying 
circulators as “paid”). 
 One of the 
most notable aspects of the petition drive to recall Governor 
Walker is that it was mounted primarily and perhaps entirely 
by volunteers working quickly in the cold of the winter, a char-
acteristic that provided credible and persuasive information 
about the depth of the support for the recall among the popula-
tion at that time. Indeed, Walker’s forces tried to discredit the 
 151. See Garrett, Agenda Setting, supra note 19, at 1879–89. 
 152. Colorado requires a badge, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112 (2012), 
while several other states like Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN. § 19-102 (2002), 
require notice on the petition itself. 
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recall movement by claiming that they were paying signature 
gatherers,153
Third, effective and well-structured disclosure must con-
tinue throughout the campaign period. New technology pro-
vides both opportunities and challenges for regulators. The op-
portunity is for regulators to use websites and other means of 
communication to provide voters and intermediaries like the 
press information that is well organized, easy to search and 
understand, and timely, provided throughout the campaign in 
regular and frequent intervals. The challenge is to apply disclo-
sure provisions to new methods of communication used by 
campaigns and entities involved in campaign-related speech. 
The Federal Election Commission has promulgated regulations 
applying disclaimers to Internet communications,
 a tactic that suggests how powerful this infor-
mation may be in motivating voters’ decision whether to sign a 
petition. However, we lack empirical data to confirm that sup-
position.  
154 and states 
are beginning to move to extend disclosure laws broadly to elec-
tronic communications, with reach beyond broadcast, radio and 
print advertisements.155 Regulation needs to strike a balance 
between applying the same disclosure rules—in terms of disclo-
sure about spending and disclaimers on the communications—
to communications over the Internet as they have with tradi-
tional media, as well as ensuring that the Internet remains “a 
flourishing source of robust and vibrant political discourse 
among citizens.”156
 
 153. Walker Claims Recall Petition Circulators Are Being Paid, CHAN-
NEL3000.COM (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.channel3000.com/news/Walker 
-Claims-Recall-Petition-Circulators-Are-Being-Paid/-/1648/8298484/-/txrx3t/-/ 
index.html. 
 In some cases, statutory language allows 
thoughtful regulatory approaches, but often the language itself 
will have to be broadened to include methods of communication 
unimagined by drafters. 
 154. FEC Internet Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 18,589 (Apr. 12, 2006) 
(codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 110, 114). 
 155. See States Expand Definition of Electioneering Communications to 
Guard Against Corruption, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Feb. 7, 2013), http:// 
www.brennancenter.org/analysis/state-electioneering-communication 
-definitions (listing states which already include electronic communications in 
definition of electioneering). 
 156. SUBCOMM. ON INTERNET POLITICAL ACTIVITY, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL 
PRACTICES COMM’N, INTERNET POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND THE POLITICAL RE-
FORM ACT 9 (2010), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/agendas/08-10/ 
SubCommReport.pdf. 
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Another challenge in crafting disclosure laws is piercing 
the veils that increasingly shield the real parties behind the 
funding from public view.157 Political groups are now using var-
ious nonprofit structures for election-related activities, includ-
ing 501(c)(4) organizations, which are civic and social welfare 
organizations that promote the “common good and general wel-
fare” and that can engage in political activity that is issue driv-
en.158 One advantage of the 501(c)(4) structure is that there is 
no legal requirement for these groups to disclose their individ-
ual donors. The organization of political groups can be stun-
ningly complex, as one group may use various nonprofit struc-
tures—including, to a limited extent, charitable 501(c)(3) 
organizations—to arrange its political activities to provide the 
most flexibility, the desired level of protection against disclo-
sure, and the greatest ability to raise funds. A study by the 
Center for Responsive Politics concludes that 53% of federal 
non-party independent political spending was fully disclosed 
publicly in 2010;159 the rest has been called “dark money.”160
Designing disclosure laws to provide necessary information 
despite complex organizational structures should be a primary 
focus. California’s Fair Political Practices Commission recently 
passed regulations designed to appropriately disclose contribu-
tors to nonprofits of any kind that are active in state cam-
paigns. The regulations seek to limit disclosure to donors who 
know their contributions will be used to fund California elec-
tion campaigns—candidate or ballot measure—and donors who 
make the contributions after the group make at least one cam-
paign expenditure in California, an act which would put them 
 
Even organizations that are subject to federal or state disclo-
sure requirements manage to evade or significantly delay dis-
closure by receiving contributions from nonprofits not subject to 
disclosure themselves or from corporations that do not disclose 
their owners or go out of business soon after the donation. 
 
 157. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 10 (discussing tactics used to hide 
sources of political money in direct democracy). 
 158. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
 159. See Outside Spending, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www 
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2013); see 
also Briffault, Super PACs, supra note 120, at 1764 (describing tactics used by 
Super PACs); Mike McIntire & Nicholas Confessore, Tax-Exempt Groups 
Shield Political Gifts of Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at A1 (describing 
tactics used to create dark money despite disclosure laws). 
 160. See, e.g., Anupama Narayanswamy, Dark Money Groups Spend $110 
Million in 168 Races, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 28, 2010), http://reporting 
.sunlightfoundation.com/2010/dark-money-donors/. 
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on notice that their money could be used for campaigns.161 
Richard Briffault provides a different solution to disclosing do-
nors in a way that still allows some to support nonprofits anon-
ymously, as long as they limit their financial participation to 
non-campaign-related activities. He suggests that nonprofits 
could be required to set up separate accounts dedicated to polit-
ical activity, much like a PAC, and regulators could then apply 
disclosure laws only to donors to those accounts, an approach 
similar to that included in the proposed DISCLOSE Act at the 
federal level and found in some state systems.162
Finally, disclosure laws must be structured so that only 
donors making significant contributions to candidate, ballot 
measure, or recall campaigns are revealed. To avoid infor-
mation overload that diminishes the utility of helpful infor-
mation for voters, statutes should work to provide only the in-
formation that can serve as a voting cue. Although more 
empirical work is necessary to determine what kind of infor-
mation improves voter competence and how that information 
can best be provided,
 
163 there is a growing consensus that dis-
closure thresholds should be set significantly higher in most 
states and localities (although still at different levels depending 
on the dynamics of the campaigns).164
 
 161. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, §§ 18215, 18412 (2004); Memorandum 
from Zackery P. Morazzini, Gen. Counsel & Lawrence T. Woodlock, Senior 
Comm’n Counsel, to the Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, A More Accurate 
Rule for Reporting the Source of Funding for Expenditures by Multi-Purpose 
Groups (Mar. 26, 2012), available at http://www.fppc.ca.gov/agendas/04-12/ 
13Regulation18412%20Memo.pdf; see also Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Ran-
dolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1186 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding disclosure applied to 
such committees as serving informational interests, particularly when donors 
try to avoid publicity through complicated organizational arrangements). 
 This change typically re-
quires legislative involvement because thresholds usually ap-
pear in statutes or ordinances, perhaps with directions for reg-
ulators to adjust them periodically for inflation.  
 162. Richard Briffault, Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens 
United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337, 356–57 (2011). 
 163. For some of the empirical work done so far, see Craig Burnett, Eliza-
beth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 
ELECTION L.J. 305 (2010); Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: In-
formation and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994). 
 164. See, e.g., Briffault, Disclosure 2.0, supra note 10, at 300–01; Elizabeth 
Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1011, 1044–45 (2003); Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 280–81 
(2010); William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Polit-
ical Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 1, 51–52 (2003).  
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Bruce Cain has advocated for “semi-disclosure” of small 
donors, providing only aggregate information about their gen-
eral characteristics (for example, zip codes, occupations, resi-
dent or nonresident status, number of donors at particular lev-
els).165 If regulators believe they need more information to 
administer the system effectively, additional information could 
be disclosed to them, but not disseminated broadly to the pub-
lic.166
Protecting small donors from more individualized public 
disclosure also helps to protect them from any possible retalia-
tion, which is arguably more likely in a world where third par-
ties are providing information about individuals’ political activ-
ities through websites. Claims of economic and other retaliation 
directed toward relatively small donors have been made in the 
context of ballot measures relating to the definition of “mar-
riage,” although the evidence supporting the claims often falls 
short of the allegations and has not sustained a successful con-
stitutional challenge.
 This aggregated information may provide helpful cues to 
voters by characterizing the level of grassroots support for a 
candidate or ballot measure, by suggesting interest groups that 
may be involved significantly on one side or the other, and by 
revealing the extent of out-of-state support for an issue or can-
didate.  
167 Nonetheless, in a world of instant and 
broad dissemination of information on the Internet, the threat 
that some small donors may value their privacy with respect to 
political donations and thus decline to participate in the politi-
cal realm is serious enough for policy makers to consider when 
crafting laws, particularly because the disclosure of particular-
ized information has little informational benefit.168
  CONCLUSION   
 
Although state-level recalls remain rare, they are the quin-
tessential example of hybrid democracy, combining an issue 
campaign, albeit one explicitly tied to a public official, and a 
 
 165. See Bruce Cain, The Shade from the Glare: The Case for Semi-
Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2010/ 
11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-semi-disclosure/; see also 
David Lourie, Rethinking Donor Disclosure after the Proposition 8 Campaign, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 159–70 (2009). 
 166. Briffault, Disclosure 2.0, supra note 10, at 301. 
 167. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2011). 
 168. See Hasen, Chill Out, supra note 10, at 566–67 (making a similar rec-
ommendation); McGeveran, supra note 164, at 13–20 (discussing privacy in-
terests and costs). 
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candidate campaign. They therefore provide an environment to 
study the effect of campaign finance rules on all aspects of hy-
brid democracy, and to determine whether the jurisprudential 
approaches to assessing their validity lead to sensible policy re-
sults. My analysis reveals that the current narrow focus on a 
particular understanding of quid pro quo corruption allows only 
for a bifurcated system of campaign rules that is likely to con-
tinue to leave voters suspicious that democratic institutions 
lack integrity. Similarly, any expanded regulation of contribu-
tion limits in other ballot measure campaigns—a possibility 
once we understand the close relationship between initiatives 
and candidates—will also necessarily be bifurcated. To success-
fully enact a comprehensive system of contribution limits, ei-
ther the courts will have to accept more robust state interests, 
perhaps those that stem from egalitarian values, or lawmakers 
will need to replace bifurcated regulatory structures with com-
prehensive, extensive and effective disclosure statutes. 
 
